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I. Introduction. 
 
The International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF), the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) and 
the Economic Policy Institute (EPI), as part of a joint Ford Foundation project, are seeking to 
articulate an alternative economic vision for the global economy that will share the benefits of 
economic development with working people and harness global capital to serve development 
objectives.  The ILRF contribution to the project is to examine past and current efforts to protect 
labor rights in the global economy and to make a proposal for more effective implementation of 
these rights.  An assumption of the ILRF analysis is that improved labor rights recognition and 
enforcement in the global economy is essential to a rational policy of sustainable economic 
development. Better implementation of labor rights will allow workers in the global economy to 
improve their wages and terms and conditions of employment. More fundamentally, global 
mechanisms to protect labor rights are essential to create the political space necessary to allow 
workers to form trade unions and other civil society organizations that can act to counterbalance 
the virtually unchecked power of global capital. The EPI portion of the project develops the 
economic analysis to support this assumption and more generally examines economic policy 
issues that would lead to broad-based economic development.  IPS examines other aspects of an 
overall economic policy to benefit working people, including reform of international financial 
institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, and regulating private capital flows to leaven the 
gold rush mentality that can devastate developing economies with massive and sudden capital 
withdrawals when returns start to diminish.  
 
Any proposals for enforcing worker rights globally must be made in the incredibly 
complicated and confused context of global politics. While there are certainly flexible positions 
emerging from outside the U.S. and Europe,1 much of the debate over proposals to add labor 
rights to trade agreements is mired in an intense debate over the motives of the proponents of 
this idea: is there a genuine concern for workers or is it a pretext for protectionism? Those 
advocating some form of international labor rights regualtion are often labeled protectionists, 
even by progressive organizations from the South,2 as well as Southern governments and 
business interests in the North,3 which oppose any social regulation that would endanger the 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., H. Totsuka, Some Thoughts on “Asian Social Charter”, Bulletin, Center for Transnational 
Labor Studies, No. 3,  27 (Nov. 1997).  
2 M. Khor, Northern Trade Protectionism and Workers’ Rights, Third World Economics, 16-30 (April 
1994). At a February 6, 1998 presentation at IPS, Khor clarified that his concern is that whatever the motives of 
advocates pressing for a social clause, once enacted, Northern governments could use the clause for protectionist 
purposes. This then presents a challenge to draft the social clause and its enforcement provisions so that this risk is 
eliminated or substantially minimized.  
3 In the recent debate over renewal of President Clinton’s “fast track” negotiating authority, simply 
asserting that there should be open debate and a slower process resulted in vehement assertions of “protectionism” 
by the pro-business press. See, e.g., P. Blustein, Free Trade vs. Social Policy, Washington Post, G-1& 8 (Sept. 19, 
1997)(Citing Senator Gramm who claims that advocates for labor and environmental standards in trade agreements 
are simply trying to keep competitive products out of the market).  
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current supply of cheap, exploitable labor, thus creating a very unlikely alliance of opposition to 
social regulation in the global economy). Fortunately, more and more trade unions and NGOs 
from the South are recognizing that their people are being exploited by multinational companies 
(MNCs) operating on a global basis, and the only solution for dealing with them is worldwide 
labor regulation.4 
 
The lingering perception by opponents of a global labor regulation that North Americans 
and Europeans, regardless of institutional or political affiliation, are pressing in unison for a 
social clause to prevent job loss in their own countries by removing the comparative advantage 
of cheap labor in the South must be directly addressed. Based on past practice, this view is not 
entirely without justification. Many Northern trade unions and governments have been very clear 
in advocating policies designed to protect and preserve jobs. Before the recent, systematic 
integration of the global economy, that was a reasonable strategy for any nation to pursue. 
Everything has changed now, however. No country can pursue a domestic agenda in a vacuum. 
No union or NGO can confront effectively the global power of MNCs without global allies. 
While unions and NGOs continue to have their territorial battles within and across 
national boundaries, the (largely North American and European) MNCs are united in their 
global vision to protect property and investments, and to keep wages low and profits high. 
This is evidenced quite dramatically by the success of highly-competitive technology firms in 
cooperating for their mutual interest in securing the inclusion of very strict rules to protect 
intellectual property rights in the last GATT round5 and in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA).6 This is in sharp contrast to the failure of labor and human rights 
organizations to achieve inclusion of an enforcable labor or social rights clause in these trade 
agreements. 
 
                                                 
4 See, for example, the discussion below at pages 15-18 of innovative proposals made by unions in South 
America for a Social Charter as part of Mercosur. 
5Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multinational Trade Negotiations, December 
15, 1993, Annex I C.  
6NAFTA, Part VI, Chapter 17.  
From the perspective of trade unions and NGOs from the North seeking to advance a new 
economic vision for workers in the global economy,  a necessary prerequisite for successful 
cooperation with partners from the South then is resolution of a very basic question: If the major 
reason that unions and NGOs in the North would act internationally to improve conditions for 
workers is to protect jobs, then the workers in Bangladesh or Mexico or China or any other 
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country where MNCs have moved significant manufacturing operations should refuse to 
cooperate with any initiatives that could endanger their jobs. At the same time, unless unions and 
NGOs from the North can successfully reach out to workers in other countries to implement a 
strategy to enforce worker rights globally, no one will be able to address the needs of any 
workers in the global economy, whether from the North or South.  
 
The major point of this paper is that workers in different countries are not adversaries and 
there is no actual conflict of interest between them. Broad-based economic development is a 
win-win proposition for workers. Workers in all countries must grasp that they are presently in a 
doomed competition for low wage jobs, while the MNCs are reaping the benefits of a global 
surplus of cheap labor. Workers everywhere must return to basics and act together to deal with 
the global power of MNCs. The unifying theme can be that all workers will benefit if global 
wages rise. The economic analysis supports this position.  Workers in the North will benefit if 
rising wages in the South fuel consumer demand7 and a growing part of this is consumption of 
products from the North. If in fact workers in the South can enjoy rising incomes without 
suffering significant job loss, this will be a substantial benefit for them. The bottom line is that 
the global economy can not grow if workers in the U.S. and Europe, whose high wages fuel 
global demand for consumer goods, are losing their jobs to workers in the Philippines or El 
Salvador, who earn currently bare subsistence wages.8  
 
                                                 
7 The irony is that the current economic system is based on this premise but takes no direct steps to improve 
wages for the working poor.  Global capital accepts the theory but is, for the moment, enjoying the best of both 
worlds – global markets and cheap labor.  Global growth  obviously is not an infinite progression. There must be 
serious concern for sustainability. However, the overall theme of our approach is that there must be a major focus on 
redistribution of the benefits of global growth to support domestic demand in developing countries, rather than 
propping up wealthy elites. The economic analysis for our position is supported by the EPI paper, Alternatives to the 
Neo-Liberal Model that Address Differences Between North and South, and Labor and the Environment. 
8The papers by EPI and IPS will explore the economic arguments underlying this assertion. 
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The basis for the unifying ideology is the often-repeated mantra: Trade is not an end in 
itself. The preamble to the original General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), signed in 
1947, stated: "Relations among countries in the field of trade and economic endeavor should be 
conducted with a view to raising standards of living and ensuring full employment."9 This long 
dormant idea should be the central tenant of an international policy for worker rights. Growth in 
the global economy must now be fueled by rising incomes of the enormous number of workers in 
China, India, Mexico, Brazil and other emerging economies. If these workers can obtain a 
liveable wage and have some disposable income to purchase consumer items, this will increase 
global demand and create jobs for workers everywhere. If the MNCs, and World Bank and IMF 
economists don't accept this proposition, then the global trading system must be reassessed for 
its failure to realize the noble goal of the GATT preamble. It would be difficult for working 
people in any country to continue to support a system that shifts jobs from high wage to low 
wage countries if it doesn't offer the immediate prospect for creating new growth through rising 
wages for the poorest workers, and prohibiting exploitive labor practices. 
 
In this paper, we consider two areas that offer significant prospects for using global trade 
as a vehicle for improving enforcement of labor rights, including the fundamental rights to 
associate and organize trade unions, which provide the only sustainable mechanism for ensuring 
that workers have a voice in the larger economic debate. First, trade agreements can be 
conditioned to include a substantive standard for worker rights.  There is a significant consensus 
on what international labor rights should constitute a labor clause, which largely includes ILO 
Conventions ratified by or satisfied by the domestic laws of most countries in the world.10 This 
approach requires the direct cooperation of governments and is dependent upon a significant 
change in direction from a well-rooted “free trade” status quo to an ideology that prioritizes  
issues of concern to working people and the environment. A second area is the development of 
“codes of conduct” and mechanisms for monitoring that, in effect, impose a private regulatory 
system on companies operating in the global economy, enforced by consumer choice. This 
approach depends upon consumer education and participation, as well as company cooperation. 
Both avenues offer practical mechanisms for enforcing labor laws and can be pursued on parallel 
fronts. No proposal for a more just economic system in the global economy can be achieved, 
however,  unless the working people most affected agree to pursue a cooperative strategy.  
    
 
 
II. Using Trade as a Lever for Improved Enforcement of  
Labor Rights. 
 
A. The Trade-Labor Rights Linkage 
                                                 
9 See, e.g.,  Collingsworth, Goold and Harvey, Time for a Global New Deal, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 12 
(Jan. -Feb. 1994). 
10 See discussion at pages 25-31 infra for the precise parameters of the social clause. 
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In 1843, Edouard Ducpétiaux, a Belgian economist, issued a challenge to the future that 
has yet to be realized: 
 
What argument is so often leveled against projects for industrial reform? It is the tyranny 
of competition . . . Man disappears in this desperate struggle; he is no longer anything 
more than a weapon with the aid of which blows are given or parried. . . . Let nations 
unite for social reform instead of frustrating one another’s efforts. Let them summon 
a general congress to regulate their mutual concerns: commercial and industrial relations 
and the problems of workers. All civilized nations should concur in this truly holy 
alliance which should open to humanity a new area of well-being and universal 
satisfaction.11 
 
Starting with Ducpétiaux, the historical and conceptual basis for linking labor rights with 
trade is solid.  The founding of the ILO with ratification of its constitution in 1919 offered real 
hope of progress with its bold declaration that: 
 
Whereas universal and lasting peace can only be established if it is based upon social 
justice; And whereas conditions of labour exist involving such injustice, hardship and 
privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and 
harmony of the world are imperilled; and an improvement of those conditions is urgently 
required; as, for example, by the regulation of the hours of work, including establishment 
of a maximum working day and week, the regulation of the labour supply, the prevention 
of unemployment, the provision of an adequate living wage, the protection of the worker 
against sickness, disease and injury arising out of his employment, the protection of 
children, young persons and women, provision for old age and injury, protection of the 
interests of workers when employed in countries other than their own, recognition of the 
principle of equal remuneration for work of equal value, recognition of the principle of 
freedom of association, the organization of vocational and technical education and other 
measures. Whereas also the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is 
an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their 
own countries . . . .12 
 
The vision of the ILO’s preamble remains unrealized, but the ILO has itself consistently 
reaffirmed the rhetoric. The ILO’s Declaration of Philadelphia, ratified in 1944, stated as a basic 
principle that “lasting peace can be established only if it is based on social justice.”13 The 
                                                 
11 De la condition physique et morale des jeunes ouvriers et des moyens de l’améliorer (1843), quoted in 
J.W. Follows, Antecedents of the International Labour Organization 43 (1951)(emphasis added). 
12 Preamble to the Constitution of the International Labor Organization (1919). 
13 Declaration Concerning the Aims and Purposes of the International Labor Organization (Philadelphia 
Declaration), Art. II, published as an Annex to the Constitution of the International Labor Organization, 22 (May, 
1989). 
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Declaration goes on to say that: 
 
(c) all national and international policies and measures, in particular those of an 
economic and financial character, should be judged in this light and accepted only in so 
far as they may be held to promote and not to hinder the achievement of this fundamental 
objective [achieving social justice].14  
 
 The previously cited language of the GATT preamble explicitly linking trade to “raising 
standards of living and ensuring full employment”15 demonstrates that even those involved at the 
early stages of drafting trade rules understood that the major purpose of trade was to benefit 
people. Following the drafting of the GATT, there was an innovative effort to create an 
International Trade Organization (ITO) to implement the new trading regime. The ITO would 
have been charged with ensuring that trade met specific social aims, including elimination of 
unfair labor conditions.16 This effort failed largely due to the United State’s refusal to ratify the 
                                                 
14 Id at 23 (emphasis added). The ILO is attempting to revive the spirit of its Preamble and the Philadelphia 
Declaration with a recent initiative to focus on “core” labor standards that will expand the scope of its present 
investigatory powers to include all of the core rights. It will still, however, be left without power to enforce its 
findings. See Defending Values, Promoting Change, Social justice in a global economy: An ILO agenda, Report of 
the Director General to the 81st Session of the International Labour Conference (1994). 
15 See note 8, supra. 
16  MacShane, Human Rights and Labor Rights, A European Perspective, in  L. Compa and S. Diamond, 
Human Rights, Labor Rights, and International Trade 63-64 (1996). 
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ITO charter.17   
 
In 1927, Herbert Feis’ International Labour Legislation in the Light of Economic 
Theory18 provided a pre-Great Depression analysis of the relationship between labor standards 
and international economic growth. Since then, numerous commentators and politicians have 
affirmed the obvious link between trade and the most essential aspect of the means of 
production, labor.19 As former Congressman Donald J. Pease stated as his objective in authoring 
U.S. legislation linking labor rights to trade: “We seek to provide working people everywhere 
with the tools with which they can help themselves share more fully in the benefits of 
international trade.”20  
 
                                                 
17 Id.  
18 15 International Labour Review 491 (1927). 
19 See, e.g., W. Greider, One World, Ready of Not: The Manic Logic of Global Capitalism, 33-38 
(1997); Collingsworth, Goold and Harvey, Time for a Global New Deal, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 8-13 (Jan. -Feb. 
1994); Cavanagh, Compa, Ebert, Goold, Selvaggio, & Shorrock, Trade’s Hidden Costs, 1-5 (1988); Charnowitz, 
The Influence of International Labour Standards on the World Trading Regime: A Historical Overview, 126 
International Labour Review 565 (1987); G. Hansson, Social Clauses and International Trade: An Economic 
Analysis of Labour Standards in Trade Policy (1983).     
20 Cavanagh, Compa, Ebert, Goold, Selvaggio, & Shorrock, Trade’s Hidden Costs, 1 (1988). 
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The basic rationale for linkage is that poverty eradication and improved conditions for 
workers should be the focus of and primary objective of trade, not incidental, “trickle down” by-
products of an exploitive system that provides lopsided benefits to a few MNCs.21 The initial 
development goal stated in the GATT preamble and echoed in the ILO’s Constitution and the 
Declaration of Philadelphia has been substituted with a raw form of laissez faire capitalism that 
surpasses in cruel effects the last experiment in trickle down economics early in this century.22 
The ideology of trade policy has been captured by the MNCs, the one interest group that should 
be the subject of regulation, rather than the drafter of the rules.  
 
It is essential to any understanding of the need for a new trade policy that there is no such 
thing as “free trade.” The final draft concluding the Uruguay Round of negotiations and creating 
the WTO is several hundred pages of regulations setting the rules of trade and protecting market 
access for MNCs.23  A 32-page Annex I C deals only with protecting intellectual property rights, 
and the U.S. government has pursued aggressively the claims of such companies as Microsoft, 
which charged the Chinese government with failing to enforce its laws on copyright piracy. That 
this system exists, which values computer codes more than children and young people who make 
CDs in sweatshops, reflects the concentrated power of MNCs to impose regulations that protect 
their interests, and to resist regulations that might cut into their enormous profits. There is no 
defensible distinction for allowing regulations in a “free trade”regime to protect property but not 
people.24 This distortion will remain until advocates for worker rights and social justice unify to 
counterbalance the power of MNCs in setting the rules of the global economy. 
                                                 
21Economic evidence to support the assertion that trade has resulted in increasingly skewed income 
distribution rather than broad-based development is continuing to accumulate.  See, e.g., Greider, William One 
World, Ready or Not: the Manic Logic of Global Capitalism; also Deyo, Frederick, Beneath the Miracle: Labor 
Suppression in East Asia. 
22 See Time for a Global New Deal, supra note 18, at 9-11. 
23 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multinational Trade Negotiations, December 
15, 1993.  
24 Time for a Global New Deal, supra note 18, at 8-10. 
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B. History of Trade-Labor Rights Linkage in U.S. Trade Law.  
 
Labor rights advocates in the U.S. have been quite successful in legally-mandating the 
link between labor rights and trade on a unilateral basis in U.S. law.25 A series of laws have been 
passed that explicitly condition certain trade benefits on compliance with labor rights: 
 
                                                 
25 See generally, Collingsworth, American Labor Policy in the International Economy: Clarifying Policies 
and Interests, 31 Boston College Law Review 31-100 (1989). 
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(1) The Generalized System of Preferences Act ("GSP"),26 which grants developing 
countries duty free status on many exports to the U.S. conditioned on compliance with 
“internationally recognized worker rights,”  thus providing a substantial comparative 
advantage in U.S. markets. The worker rights conditionality was added to GSP in 1986. 
The idea was that the U.S. was spending billions of dollars on direct foreign assistance 
that was having little permanent impact on solving the underlying problems of poverty. 
The theme of GSP was "trade not aid," meaning that it would be a better policy to give 
benefits that helped economies to develop and grow so that countries could become self-
sustaining and direct foreign aid could be phased out;   
 
(2) The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA),27 which is virtually 
identical to the GSP program but focuses on the Caribbean basin. 
 
(3) Overseas Private Investment Corporation ("OPIC"),28 which  provides financing and 
insurance to U.S. companies investing in developing countries provided that the host 
country is in compliance with “internationally recognized  worker rights”; 
 
(4) The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, passed in 1988, which amended 
section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,29 which applies to all U.S. trading partners and 
makes failure to comply with “internationally recognized worker rights” an unfair trading 
practice and subjects the offender to a wide range of sanctions. Compliance with this law 
ensures that a developing country will not be subject to trade sanctions;   
 
(5) The 1992 Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,30 which restricts 
funding of U.S. AID programs that contribute to the denial of “internationally recognized 
worker rights”;  
                                                 
26 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-66 (1986).  
27 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-06 (1986).    
28 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1986).  
29 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988). 
30 22 U.S.C. § 2151 et seq (1992). 
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(6) The 1994 Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, which provides that “the 
Secretary of Treasury shall direct the United States Executive Directors of the 
International Financial Institutions . . . to use the voice and vote of the United States to 
urge the respective institution . . . to adopt policies to encourage borrowing countries to 
guarantee internationally recognized worker rights;”31 and  
                                                 
31 22 U.S.C. § 1621 (1996). 
 
 
 12 
(7) The 1997 Sanders Amendment to Section 307 of the Trade Act of 1930, which 
clarified that the ban on importation of products made with “forced” labor applied to 
products made with “forced or indentured child labor.”32 
 
All of the these laws incorporate the five factor definition of “internationally recognized 
worker rights” from the GSP provision: 
 
(A) the right of association; (B) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (C) a 
prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor; (D) a minimum age for 
the employment of children; and (E) acceptable conditions of work with respect to 
minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health.33 
 
These U.S. experiments in trade-labor rights linkage have not been very successful for a 
number of reasons, but they do demonstrate the conceptual premise that trade conditionality can 
be an effective tool for regulating worker rights. These models also offer insight into the 
problems that will be encountered in seeking to develop an enforceable labor rights clause as 
part of the rules of trade.34  
 
                                                 
32 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (1997). Following passage of the child labor provision, the ILRF immediately filed the 
first petition seeking to ban the importation of hand-knotted carpets from South Asia made with child labor.  
33 19 U.S.C. § 2462 (a)(4). 
34 See P. Harvey, U.S. GSP Labor Rights Conditionality: Aggressive Unilateralism or a Forerunner to a 
Multilateral Social Clause (1995)(Unpublished paper on file with ILRF). 
 
 13 
The most significant problem in realizing the objective of improved labor rights 
enforcement is that a combination of conservative U.S. governments and powerful lobbying by 
the MNCs has prevented any real enforcement of the laws. The administrations of Presidents 
Reagan, Bush and Clinton have consistently used their discretionary authority to decline to 
enforce the worker rights provisions of the various laws. The concerned bureaucracies at the 
U.S. Trade Representative and the Departments of State, Commerce, Labor, and Treasury35 
opposed rigorous enforcement of the worker rights provisions, ultimately resulting in litigation 
brought by the ILRF to challenge the non-enforcement of the law.36 Likewise, the ILRF is 
currently pressuring the Treasury Department to comply with its obligation to require respect for 
worker rights as a condition to U.S. support for international financial institutions.37   To date, 
the Clinton Administration has been hostile to pursuing worker rights at the IMF or the World 
Bank. This experience demonstrates that any future solution requires a mandatory and 
transparent process, not easily undermined by bureaucratic hostility or inertia. Most recently, 
efforts by ILRF to require the U.S. Customs Service and the Department of Treasury to enforce 
the child labor provision of section 307 of the Trade Act of 1930 have met with extreme 
bureaucratic resistance.38  
  
For outside observers of this process, it is crucial to understand that there is not any 
homogenous “U.S. view.” Advocates for workers pushed for legislation that provided tools to 
work to improve enforcement of internationally recognized worker rights. The U.S. government 
and corporate interests disagreed with the policy and have worked to undermine it. That 
advocates for workers want stronger language and a multilateral mechanism does not change this 
fundamental dynamic.  
 
The U.S.  approach of linking trade to worker rights, while never enforced adequately, 
drew considerable criticism for being unilateral.39 This reflects a basic suspicion in the South, 
and in Europe for that matter, of anything that is perceived as U.S.-initiated action.40 However, 
the critics have failed to understand that the U.S. government, as represented by the Executive 
branch, never wanted the laws, never enforced the laws, and resisted any effort to introduce 
                                                 
35 These agencies comprise the Trade Policy Committee, which attempts to coordinate U.S. trade policy. 
36 For a complete discussion of the litigation, see Collingsworth, International Worker Rights Enforcement: 
Proposals Following a Test Case, in L. Compa and S. Diamond, Human Rights, Labor Rights, and International 
Trade 227-250 (1996). 
37 Correspondence between the ILRF and Treasury Secretary Rubin is on file at the ILRF.  
38 Correspondence between the U.S. Customs service and the ILRF regarding the non-enforcement of 
section 307 is on file with the ILRF. 
39 See, e.g., Alston, Labor Rights Provisions in U.S. Trade Law: “Aggressive Unilateralism”?, in  L. 
Compa and S. Diamond, Human Rights, Labor Rights, and International Trade 71-95 (1996). 
40 Interestingly, there has been virtually no vocal criticism of the EU for adopting a GSP program very 
similar to the U.S. program.  
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social policy into trade policy. The entire process was an effort by labor rights advocates, 
with allies in the U.S. Congress,  to force the U.S. government to treat labor rights as a 
priority in its trading relations. These advocates also pressed Congress to pass a law that 
required the U.S. government to push for inclusion of a social clause in the GATT.41  
 
                                                 
41 19 U.S.C.§ 213 (a)(4)(1980). 
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The preferred solution remains a multilateral provision that firmly links labor rights to 
the trading regime. However, the combination of lackluster U.S. advocacy for the policy, and the 
absence of any strong allies in the multilateral discussions,42 resulted in the ratification of the 
Uruguay Round document without any social clause. At the first World Trade Organization 
(WTO) Ministerial, the WTO managed to sidestep a renewed call for a social clause by refusing 
to discuss the addition of a social clause and renewing a commitment to observe the Conventions 
of the ILO, an alternative all concerned knew meant there was no prospect of any enforcement 
threat since the ILO has no power to impose any penalty for non-compliance.43 Thus, U.S. 
advocates for labor rights are left in a bind: they are criticized for pursuing unilateral measures, 
but got little support in efforts to persuade other governments to join the U.S. in pushing for a 
social clause at the WTO. Again, any ultimate solution requires a unified effort by labor rights 
advocates on a global basis. This requires recognition that labor rights advocates in the U.S. are 
struggling to force the U.S. government to incorporate worker rights into its global trading 
agenda; the U.S. government is largely a hostile and unwilling partner in this effort, or, at its 
best, a divided and ambivalent ally.    
 
C. Regional Trade Agreements: Experiments With Multilateral Labor Rights-Trade 
Linkage  
 
A firm labor rights-trade linkage with an enforcement mechanism has not been 
established at a multilateral level. With more than 100 member countries each, the two principal 
multilateral institutions, the WTO and the ILO, each possess one-half of an enforcement 
mechanism. The WTO allows economic sanctions against countries that violate GATT rules, but 
has so far refused to adopt rules on labor rights, insisting that labor issues belong in the ILO.44 
For its part, the ILO can investigate and determine violations of international labor standards, but 
has no sanctioning power. Another multilateral institution, the 29-member OECD, has 
                                                 
42 See infra pages 34-36 and the accompanying text for a discussion of the effort to include a “social 
clause” to the WTO at the December 13, 1996 Singapore Ministerial. 
43 Singapore Ministerial Declaration, ¶ 4 (December 13, 1996). 
44 See text at notes 133-138  infra for a discussion of the WTO’s refusal to deal with worker rights. 
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“guidelines” for multinational corporations in their dealings with unions,45 and a forum for 
consultation on alleged violations. However, the OECD does not contemplate sanctions as a 
remedy.46 
 
                                                 
45 See OECD, Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (1976, revised 1979). 
46 See B. Glade and E. Potter, Targeting the Labor Practices of Multinational Companies, Focus on Issues 
(U.S. Council for International Business, July, 1989); D. Campbell and R. Rowen, Multinational Enterprises and 
the OECD Industrial Relations Guidelines (1983); J. Robinson, Multinationals and Political Control. 
Regional labor rights regimes are starting to fashion a stronger link between labor rights 
and trade. Each of  the three main regional groupings -- the European Union (EU), the Common 
Market of the South (Mercosur), and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)  -- 
has created institutions and mechanisms to treat issues of workers’ rights in connection with 
economic integration. A review of these three efforts to create labor rights regimes offers 
valuable lessons for developing new, effective means of enforcing labor rights in trade on a 
global basis. 
 
1. European Union 
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Since its founding by the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the EU has developed an elaborate 
institutional framework for both economic integration and for coordination of military, political, 
and monetary policy. This includes a plan for a single currency beginning in 1999, although the 
plan has run into resistance from workers and citizens concerned about cuts in labor standards 
and welfare benefits considered “acquired rights” after decades of social progress.47 
 
Europe has seen a series of “social charters" of varying scope and effectiveness before 
the current Community Charter of Basic Social Rights for Workers was adopted in 1989: 
 
1) Social provisions of the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms included several labor rights provisions drawn from the UN’s Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. The European Convention and a series of protocols that followed 
have given rise to many cases involving labor rights and labor standards brought before the 
European Court of Human Rights, which remains independent from the EU structure. 
 
2) The 1957 Treaty of Rome contained a brief statement of social rights, but with no 
accompanying mechanism for oversight or enforcement. 
 
3) A 1961 European Social Charter was adopted by the Council of Europe (not an EU 
institution), applicable to all the countries of Europe. 
 
4) A 1987 Protocol to the 1961 European Social Charter added clauses on social rights affecting 
workplace equality between men and women, rights to information and consultation in the 
workplace, and worker participation in setting working conditions. 
 
5) A 1989 Social Charter was approved as part of the formation of the European Free Trade Area 
(EFTA), which included the members of the EU plus the Scandinavian states and the historically 
neutral states, along with Eastern European countries that have gradually been joining the EFTA 
and have now begun to join the EU. 
 
                                                 
47See Nicholas Bray, “European Labor Scorns Single Currency: Unions Say Required Budget Cost Too 
Many Jobs,” Wall Street Journal, October 10, 1996, at A13; “Insecure or Jobless, Europeans Renew Protests: Social 
safety nets are worn at a time leaders feel they must limit deficits,” New York Times, March 25, 1997, at D4; Alan 
Friedman, “European Workers Angry: Downsizing, Spending Cuts Sparking Street Protests, Washington Post, 
March 25, 1997, at C3. 
The 1986 enlargement of the EU to include a "South" of Portugal, Spain and Greece 
prompted a reshaping of these many "social charters" into a new, detailed Community Charter of 
Basic Social Rights for Workers in 1989. The Charter was followed by the "Social Protocol and 
Agreement" to the Maastricht Treaty on European Union in 1992, which set conditions for 
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adopting binding, Europe-wide legislation on labor rights. 
 
The Community Charter of Basic Social Rights for Workers covers these subjects: 
 
   --the right to freedom of movement 
   --employment and remuneration 
   --the improvement of living and working conditions 
   --the right to social protection 
   --the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining 
   --the right to vocational training 
   --the right of men and women to equal treatment 
   --the right to information, consultation and participation 
   --the right to health and safety in the workplace 
   --the protection of children and adolescents in employment 
   --the protection of elderly persons 
   --protection of persons with disabilities. 
 
In the EU system, “Directives” proposed by the European Commission and adopted by 
the Council of Ministers require member countries to conform their laws to a European standard. 
On labor rights, the EU has adopted several Directives on such matters as health and safety, 
equal treatment of men and women, and consultation with workers. A recent Works Council 
Directive requires European companies — defined as firms with 1,000 or more employees in two 
or more countries — to consult annually with worker representatives on future employment 
plans.  
 
The European Commission and the Council of Ministers are the predominant operative 
bodies in the EU structure. The Commission proposes and the Council, which represents the 
executive authority of each member country, adopts Directives, the only true “legislation” in the 
EU system. However, a popularly elected European Parliament is growing in importance, from 
its beginnings as a merely advisory body to one that is now more assertive. Although it still does 
not have any power to enact legislation, a power reserved to the Council, the European 
Parliament does have a role in initiating or blocking Commission proposals.  
 
The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 revised EU decision making powers to permit Directives 
on certain topics to be adopted by qualified system of majority vote through a weighted voting 
system meant to balance interests of large and small members. This revision ended the power of 
a single country to veto a Directive, and binds countries that vote against a Directive that passes 
with a qualified majority.  
 
The Maastricht social protocol creates a 3-tier system of issues subject to possible 
Europe-wide legislation in the form of Directives. The EU can adopt Directives by qualified 
majority voting in matters of health and safety, working conditions, information and consultation 
of workers, equality between women and men, and persons excluded from the labor market. 
Unanimity is required for Directives that deal with social security, job security, worker 
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participation, employment of 3rd-country nationals, and job creation. However, Maastricht 
prohibits any Directives on union organizing, collective bargaining, or the right to strike. 
Considered so integral to national character and so dependent on national history, these matters 
are reserved to the domestic polity.48 This is a salient “tiering” of labor rights into different 
categories with different levels of enforcement, a phenomenon also found in the NAFTA labor 
rights structure.49 
 
A country’s failure to implement an EU Directive in its domestic law can be challenged 
in the European Court of Justice after exhausting all domestic tribunals. However, the ECJ does 
not have the power to order economic sanctions or to send out a European police (no such police 
exists)  to enforce its judgments when violations are found. The “enforcement” power in the 
European Union comes down to willingness of countries to abide by ECJ rulings out of a sense 
of responsibility to each other, based on the notion  that if countries began to spurn ECJ 
decisions, the entire fabric of European integration could start to unravel.  
 
For example, British laws were found by the ECJ to violate EU Directives requiring 
worker consultation in a plant closing.50  France amended laws limiting night work by women 
after an ECJ ruling found the laws in violation of EU Directive on equal treatment of men and 
women.51  German laws providing affirmative action for women workers were recently struck 
down by the court on similar grounds.52  The German affirmative action ruling suggests that 
controversies over “reverse discrimination” are not limited to the United States. It also 
demonstrates that a supranational labor rights authority is not certain to hand down decisions 
always to the liking of progressives. 
                                                 
48 See Maastricht Treaty on European Union, Protocol and Agreement on Social Policy, Art. 118 (1)-(6), 
Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247, 357. 
49 See discussionat pages 21-22, infra. 
50See Robert Rice and David Goodhart, “Britain ruled in breach of EU employment laws,” Financial Times, 
June 9, 1994, at 1. 
51 See "European Community Cannot Ban Night work For Women," 9 Employee 
Relations Weekly 856, Bureau of National Affairs (August 5, 1991). 
52See “Setback for German Labor Law,” World Wire, Wall Street Journal, May 16, 1997, at A15. 
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There is a general impression outside Europe that the EU labor rights regime is a model 
to be emulated in NAFTA or in other mechanisms to implement workers’ rights in trade.53 
Interestingly, however, European trade unionists and labor rights advocates are highly critical of 
the EU scheme. A recent proposal to revise the European labor rights system has been submitted 
by over 100 labor law experts, with the support of European trade unions. They call the current 
EU labor rights instruments “inadequate” and say that they have “fallen far short of an effective 
protection of fundamental rights.”54 
 
The Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers is a “side agreement,” 
not an integral part of the Treaty of European Union. It remains an aspirational instrument, not 
real norms with which countries must comply. Where binding Directives have been enacted, they 
tend to be in relatively uncontroversial areas like health and safety or worker consultation. As 
noted above, European Directives can be used to strike down affirmative action laws.  
 
No directives can be adopted on union organizing, collective bargaining, or the right to 
strike. European employers are pressing for deregulation of the employment relationship and 
cuts in social benefits, and the European Commission has pulled back from promoting the 
“Action Programme” for implementing the Community Charter in favor of deregulating 
measures.55  The movement to “flexibilize” European labor relations has accelerated in recent 
years as unemployment has risen and manufacturing shops have “run away” to lower cost EU 
members, to non-EU European countries, and to the United States.56 
 
There is no true Europe-wide collective bargaining. Trade unions are still embedded in 
their national frameworks, with intermittent cross-border communication and collaboration, 
despite the presence of Europe-wide labor bodies and efforts to coordinate action under the 
Works Council Directive. Indeed, some employers are embracing the Works Council Directive 
                                                 
53 See, e.g., J. Brecher and T. Costello, Global Village or Global Pillage (1994). 
54See, e.g.,  Blanpain et. al., Fundamental Social Rights: Proposals for the European Union (1996). 
55See R. Taylor, “EU bows to employers over rights of workers,” Financial Times, April 12, 1995, at 1. 
56See, e.g., Helen Lachs Ginsburg, “Fall from grace: Entrance in the EU has increased pressure on Sweden 
to dismantle its welfare state,” In These Times, December 23, 1996, at 21. 
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as a device to bypass unions and deal with employee representatives drawn from white collar and 
lower management ranks.57 Cross-border collaboration between trade unions through the Works 
Council process (when a union is the representative for the Works Council) offers great 
unrealized potential. 
 
2. Mercosur  
 
                                                 
57See Robert Taylor, “Unilever switch on works council,” Financial Times, April 12, 1995, at 3. 
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The Common Market of the South--known as Mercosur in Spanish--was the outgrowth of 
political and economic ties between Argentina and Brazil following the return to democratic rule 
in both countries in the mid-1980s.58  The growing bilateral ties evolved into the idea of 
Mercosur when Uruguay and Paraguay joined the two countries with the signing of the Treaty of 
Asuncion in 1991.  (Chile and Bolivia have since become associate members). As the most 
ambitious attempt yet toward regional integration in Latin America, the ultimate goal of 
Mercosur is the creation of a "common market," allowing for the free mobility of investment, 
labor and services, as well as trade in goods, among the members.  As an interim step toward that 
goal, as of January 1995, Mercosur organized itself as a customs union in which the member 
countries have a common external tariff covering imports from third countries, with largely 
tariff-free trade among the four members.   
 
Mercosur countries have focused their attention on the intricacies of economic 
integration, and did not initially take up labor rights as part of their agenda. Unions from the four 
countries organized a coalition, the Southern Cone Central Labor Coordination (CCSCS in its 
Spanish/Portugese acronym) and fought to have the Mercosur discussions opened up to workers 
and social organizations.  As a result of this pressure, in 1992 a tripartite Mercosur Working 
Group on Labor Relations, Employment, and Social Security was set up, with the initial mandate 
of harmonizing labor laws and benefits in the region.59 Government, employer, and trade union 
representatives made up the Working Group and created subcommittees on the following topics: 
 
--individual labor relations 
--collective labor relations 
--employment 
–training 
–health and safety 
--social security 
--sectoral matters (specifically in transportation and agricultural labor) 
--review of ILO Conventions and draft of a Social Charter 
 
Among other accomplishments, the labor Working Group called for member countries to 
each ratify 34 Conventions of the ILO deemed relevant and necessary for fair labor standards in 
the Southern Cone market. Among these, the Working Group noted that 11 Conventions had 
already been adopted by all four countries:  
 
                                                 
58 See generally, Mercosur 1997, Orbis Publications, Washington DC, 1997. 
59 INFOSUR - Informacion Sindical Sobre el Mercosur, No. 2, Coordinadora de Centrales Sindicales del 
Cono Sur, 1996. 
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--No. 11 on unionization in agriculture 
--No. 14 on weekly days of rest 
--No. 26 on minimum wages 
--No. 81 on labor inspectors 
--No. 95 on salary protection 
--No. 98 on freedom of association and the right to bargain collectively 
--No. 100 on equal pay 
--No. 105 on the abolition of forced labor 
--No. 111 on non-discrimination in employment 
--No. 115 on protection against radiation poisoning 
--No. 159 on retraining 
 
The Working Group characterized these universally-adopted ILO Conventions as 
substantive labor rights norms for Mercosur, setting a stage for consideration of further 
measures. The CCSCS went further and drafted a complete Social Charter for consideration in 
the Working Group, incorporating relevant clauses from international human rights instruments 
and from other ILO Conventions.  
 
As described by the Brazilian Confederasion Unica de Trabajo (CUT), the Charter "was 
conceived as a way to improve social and living conditions, strengthen democracy and protect 
those sections of the population most vulnerable to the effects of economic integration.  It is 
inspired by a concept of human rights that extends beyond labor rights, encompassing the basic 
individual rights of all citizens in the Mercosur--life, liberty, health, education, nutrition, a safe 
and healthy working environment, and a social safety net--as well as collective rights, such as 
freedom of organization, collective bargaining, the right to strike, and freedom of information."60 
  To date, the governments have not officially responded to the Charter proposal, effectively 
blocking its adoption. 
 
The unions have further proposed that issues related to the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights be dealt with by two additional institutions: the Mercosur Commission for Social Rights 
and the Committee of Specialists.  The Commission for Social Rights would be made up of two 
representatives from each country's government and one from each country's professional 
sectors.  Its functions would be "to ensure compliance with the rights and obligations stipulated 
in the Charter; to issue directives to increase the effectiveness of the Charter; and to propose to 
the Council of the Mercosur economic measures, such as fines or tariffs, as penalties against 
countries that fail to comply with the Commission's resolutions."61 
 
                                                 
60 Social Charters: Perspectives from the Americas, Latin American Working Group, Toronto, 1996, p. 35. 
61 Id at 36. 
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The 1994 Protocol of Ouro Preto established a permanent institutional structure for 
Mercosur. However, the countries rejected new trade union demands for a Social Charter with 
enforceable labor rights. Instead, Ouro Preto created an Economic and Social Consultative 
Forum (FCES in its Spanish/Portugese acronym) in which business, labor, and other social 
sectors can make non-binding recommendations to the governments on labor rights and labor 
standards. Ouro Preto also created a Joint Parliamentary Commission (CPC) for selected 
lawmakers of member countries to consult with each other and to serve as a bridge to their 
respective legislatures for Mercosur matters. Meanwhile, Working Group 10, the formal 
tripartite Mercosur body on labor relations, employment, and social security, continues to deal 
with labor issues, although control by government and employer representatives makes a 
breakthrough on labor rights unlikely in the near term. 
 
As with the FCES, the CPC has no power to adopt a “charter” or any form of Mercosur-
wide legislation. Both bodies have an inherent weakness of a purely recommendatory function. 
Both governments and employer organizations have resisted an elaboration of region-wide labor 
rights and labor standards, insisting that these issues remain in the domestic lawmaking sphere.  
However, trade unions and popular organizations have recognized the potential of the FCES and 
the CJC, as well as of Working Group 10,  as arenas for promoting progressive labor policies to 
accompany regional economic integration.  
 
Within these limits of the Mercosur framework -- the labor Working Group controlled by 
governments and employer groups that continue to block a Social Charter, and an FCES and CJC 
with solely recommendatory or advisory functions -- the CCSCS and allied human rights, 
community, and other popular organizations continue demanding a Social Charter with region-
wide labor standards. 
 
It remains to be seen whether a common market can be built without a complex 
institutional structure that can act as one of the driving forces of the integration process.  Without 
independent supranational institutions, it is unlikely that Mercosur will be able to make much 
progress toward a common market, and thus development of common labor and environmental 
standards may be a very slow process. This is illustrated by the EU process, where the countries 
have a much higher level of economic development but are still struggling with the economic 
aspects of integration. The Southern Cone trade unionists generally concede that they will not be 
able to achieve their goals in the current context, and are actively pursuing other strategies. One 
alternative is demanding the inclusion of a formally constituted Labor Forum, equivalent in 
status to the already existing Business Forum, in connection with the creation of the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA).  
 
Despite the significant political obstacles to establishing enforceable social clauses 
within the Mercosur structure, the experience of creating the Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
working jointly for worker representation in the Mercosur negotiations has created the 
conditions necessary for the unions and social organizations to exercise mutual solidarity in the 
countries of the region, and has generated innovative proposals for implementing a social clause. 
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3. NAFTA 
 
The labor side agreement to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the 
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), is the first labor agreement 
explicitly related to a regional trade pact containing potential economic sanctions for labor rights 
violations following an arbitration process. NAALC has, however, been consistently criticized 
for being primarily cosmetic because these sanctions apply only to a narrow category of rights. 
With respect to the most important labor rights, particularly the right to associate, there are no  
meaningful enforcement mechanisms.62  
 
The agreement stresses cooperation on labor issues among the three NAALC countries, 
Canada, Mexico and the U.S. At the same time, however, the NAALC creates procedures for 
critical reviews by each country’s labor department, and by independent, non-governmental 
experts, of another country’s performance in enforcing domestic labor laws. The governments 
that negotiated the NAALC are in the midst of a 4-year review required by the Agreement. 
Unions, human rights organizations, employers, and other non-governmental actors have varying 
views of the NAALC, as do labor law and industrial relations experts that have been analyzing 
it.63 
 
The core of the NAALC is found in 11 Labor Principles which, while not formally 
constituting a social charter, lay a foundation for common continental norms. The NAALC 
Labor Principles include: 
 
1)  freedom of association and protection of the right to organize; 
 
2) the right to bargain collectively; 
 
3) the right to strike; 
 
                                                 
62 See, e.g., The Failed Experiment: NAFTA at Three Years, a joint study by The Economic Policy 
Institute, the Institute for Policy Studies, the International Labor Rights Fund, Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch, 
the Sierra Club, and the U.S. Business and Industrial Council Educational Foundation (June 26, 1997)(Copy on file 
at ILRF). 
63 In a January 30, 1998 letter to the National Administrative Office as part of the NAALC review, the 
ILRF was strongly critical of the NAALC and urged reforms to provide improved enforcement powers. (Copy on 
file with ILRF). 
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4) prohibition of forced labor; 
 
5) labor protections for children and young persons; 
 
6) minimum employment standards, such as minimum wages and overtime pay, covering wage 
earners, including those not covered by collective agreements; 
 
7) elimination of employment discrimination on the basis of such grounds as race, religion, age, 
sex, or other grounds as determined by each Party's domestic laws; 
 
8) equal pay for men and women; 
 
9) prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses; 
 
10) compensation in cases of occupational injuries and illnesses; 
 
11) protection of migrant workers.64 
The NAALC expressly states that these Labor Principles “do not establish common 
minimum standards,” but the countries are “committed to promote” them in their domestic law.65 
Indeed, despite the recognition in the NAALC preamble that there should be an effort to 
“protect, enhance and enforce basic workers’ rights,”66  the countries generally assume that their 
domestic laws already conform to the Labor Principles — an assumption that has been 
challenged in early cases alleging violations of the NAALC. 
 
Connected to the NAALC Labor Principles are six Obligations spelled out in the 
Agreement.67 The first is a “general duty” obligation to provide “high labor standards.”68  Other 
obligations are to effectively enforce domestic labor laws,69 to provide for private right of action 
giving legal recourse to aggrieved workers under domestic labor law,70 to provide for due 
process, transparency, and other procedural rights in the domestic labor law system,71 to publish 
                                                 
64 NAALC, Annex 1. 
65 Id. 
66NAFTA Preamble, p. 1. 
67 NAALC, Part II, Arts. 2-7. 
68 NAALC, Art. 2. 
69 NAALC, Art. 3. 
70 NAALC, Art. 4. 
71 NAALC, Art. 5. 
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and provide public access to the labor laws,72 and to promote public awareness of workers’ 
rights.73 
 
                                                 
72 NAALC, Art. 6. 
73 NAALC, Art. 7. 
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The NAALC stresses sovereignty in each country's internal labor affairs, recognizing 
"the right of each Party to establish its own domestic labor standards."74 It does not create a new 
labor rights enforcement agency to supplant the domestic authorities of each country. NAALC 
negotiators took pains to declare that "Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to empower 
a Party's authorities to undertake law enforcement activities in the territory of another Party."75   
 
The NAALC also does not create a supranational tribunal to take evidence and decide the 
guilt or innocence of employers involved in labor disputes, or to order remedies against 
violators. This is left to domestic authorities. Instead, the NAALC countries created a system for 
mutual review of labor matters and labor law enforcement in defined areas of labor law. These 
reviews are conducted first by agencies in each others’ labor departments and then, depending on 
the subject area, by independent, non-governmental evaluation committees or arbitral panels. 
 
One core obligation assumed by each of the NAALC parties is to "effectively enforce its 
labor law."76 While the countries have not yielded sovereignty on the content of their laws or the 
authorities and procedures for enforcing them, they have broken with traditional notions of 
sovereignty by opening themselves to critical international and independent reviews, evaluations 
and even arbitrations over their performance in enforcing labor laws. In three key areas -- 
minimum wage, child labor, and occupational safety and health -- the countries created a 
prospect of fines or loss of NAFTA trade benefits for a persistent pattern of failure to effectively 
enforce domestic law.77 
 
                                                 
74 NAALC, Art. 2. 
75 NAALC, Art. 42. 
76NAALC, Art. 1(e). 
77 NAALC, Arts. 29 and 41. 
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Despite the availability of the NAALC to provide wide-ranging scrutiny of labor law 
enforcement in member countries, fewer than 10 complaints have been filed in the four years 
since the Agreement went into effect. The lack of concrete remedies to benefit workers whose 
rights have been denied discourages participation by organizations lacking resources to 
participate in a process that will most likely result only in a “Ministerial Consultation.”78 No 
employer has ever bothered to appear and present testimony in defense of allegations of labor 
rights violations since there is absolutely no provision in NAALC allowing a remedy against a 
private employer.79 One complaint of discrimination against pregnant women workers in the 
maquiladora factory zone along the U.S.-Mexico border was the first case with the potential to 
go beyond ministerial consultation.80 In the hearing on the Han Young case,81substantial 
evidence was presented on health and safety violations, raising for the first time the prospect of a 
case going to the arbitration procedures of NAALC. There still has not been a case filed raising 
squarely matters of minimum wage or child labor, other issues that can be subjects of arbitration 
under the NAALC.   
 
Most complaints have been aimed at events in Mexico. In the one case involving the 
United States, a plant closing by the Sprint Corporation came under intense scrutiny through a 
NAALC review and led to a broad study of anti-union plant closings in the three NAALC 
countries.82 However, a U.S. court of appeals ultimately overruled a decision by the NLRB that 
the plant closing was an unfair labor practice.83 The court’s final ruling found in favor of the 
corporation, declaring that the plant closing was motivated by economic factors, not by anti-
unionism. U.S. unionists have asserted that this case exposes the fundamental flaw of NAALC: if 
domestic law fails to adequately protect worker rights, NAALC is powerless to improve the 
substantive standard for worker rights.  
 
There is no question that NAALC was designed to be a cooperative process that did not 
interfere with domestic labor law standards. Advocates for worker rights have consistently 
identified three fundamental weaknesses preventing NAALC from serving as a process for 
                                                 
78 NAALC, Art. 22. All but one of the cases filed involved the first of the 11 Labor Principles, Freedom of 
Association, which most worker rights advocates agree is the most important of the rights. However, under NAALC, 
the maximum relief for violation is review and a ministerial consultation. These cases cannot go farther to 
independent evaluation or arbitration. 
79 The Mexican government did appear in the Fisheries Case (No. 9601) both as the government and the 
employer. 
80 The NAO issued its report in Case No. 9701 on January 12, 1998 and requested a Ministerial 
Consultation. If the result of the consultation is not satisfactory, the NAO can request that an Evaluation Committee 
of Experts (ECE) be created under Art. 23.  This process is still pending. 
81 No. 9702. 
82 Commission for Labor Cooperation, Plant Closings and Labor Rights (1997). 
83 LCF Inc., D/B/A La Conexion Familiar v. NLRB, 129 F. 3d 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
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improving worker rights enforcement:  
 
· the lack of harmonized international labor standards, based on ILO Conventions or other 
agreed sources, that compel countries to improve their labor laws,  
 
· the inability of the NAALC to achieve specific remedies when workers’ rights are 
violated, and  
 
· a division of the Labor Principles into 3 “tiers” by which only three of the 11 Principles 
(minimum wage, child labor, and health and safety standards) can be subject to 
arbitration and possible use of trade sanctions as a remedy, and the three key Principles 
for trade unions — those on organizing, collective bargaining, and the right to strike — 
can only be subject to review and ministerial consultation, and not to independent 
evaluation or arbitration.   
 
In sharp contrast, NAFTA sets strong, common international standards on Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPR) that forced changes in Mexican laws and provide for swift, sure remedies 
for violations. NAFTA carefully defines intellectual property rights and protections for such 
things as patents, copyrights, trademarks, service marks, plant breeders' rights, industrial designs, 
trade secrets, semiconductor chips, computer programs and databases.84 These careful definitions 
of protected rights are followed by tough enforcement mechanisms. Violators of intellectual 
property rights face punitive damages, injunctive relief, sanctions against due process violations, 
IPR inspection and seizure at the border, and other strong and rapid means of halting violations.  
 
Despite its weaknesses, the hybrid approach of the NAALC — preserving each country’s 
sovereignty over labor laws and their enforcement, but submitting to reviews by each other and 
by independent, non-governmental bodies -- is probably as far as the three parties to the accord 
countries were willing to go in fashioning the first labor accord connected to an international 
trade agreement. This is especially true where the United States dominates the economic 
relationship among the three NAFTA countries, and both Mexico and Canada see their own 
labor laws as more protective of workers than those of the United States. The smaller economies 
resist any move toward harmonization that would be influenced by the gravitational pull of U.S. 
economic power. Indeed, there is already a fear among labor rights advocates in Mexico and 
Canada that the U.S. deregulatory model of labor relations is making inroads in their countries.85 
 
The NAALC contains several features that might be encouraged in further development 
of a global clause linking labor rights and trade. For one, the 11 Labor Principles range far 
                                                 
84 See generally, NAFTA, Part VI, Arts. 1701-21 for provisions relating to protection of intellectual 
property rights. 
85 See, e.g., Manuel Fuentes Muñiz, The NAFTA Labor Accord in Mexico and Its Repercussions for 
Workers, 10 Connecticut Journal of International Law 379-401 (1995), and debates surrounding proposed “right-
to-work” legislation in Alberta. 
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beyond the 3 or 4 “core” labor standards often advocated as the basis of a labor rights regime.86  
For another, NAALC is a good model for access to the process and transparency. There is ample 
opportunity for the involvement of trade unions and NGOs to use the NAALC, both in filing 
complaints and in participating in public hearings and other events. Finally, procedures for 
review, evaluation, and arbitration force governments to be called to account for their domestic 
labor law enforcement in a public international forum.  This provides much greater scrutiny than 
behind-the-scenes ILO investigations, or other forms of diplomacy. 
 
                                                 
86 See pages 25-31 infra  for a discussion of labor provisions generally included in proposals for a social 
clause.  
Other benefits stemming from NAALC relate to the unprecedented increase in exchange, 
communication and collaboration among trade unionists, labor rights advocates and labor 
researchers at the tri-national level. Under the Agreement's procedures, complaints about 
violations in one country must be initiated in another country. Thus, trade unionists and their 
allies are compelled to collaborate across North American borders to use the NAALC. Labor 
solidarity is growing and will hopefully gain strength to allow worker groups to have the 
political power to insist upon an improved mechanism for enforcing labor rights. Workers in the 
three NAALC countries are cooperating and demonstrating that they have much to gain by 
acting in unity against violators of their rights. Trade unionists and allied groups in the three 
NAALC countries now regularly send delegates to each others' conventions, conferences and 
other activities. They are trading bargaining information, translating papers and studies and 
finding new ways to link their movements. In some instances, union organizers have crossed 
borders to assist in organizing campaigns in another country. While it is not only the labor side 
agreement driving these actions, the NAALC creates a framework for concrete work nourishing 
long-term gains in labor solidarity. 
  
4. APEC. 
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Concrete steps have been taken to discuss integration of the economies of Asia through a 
loose association called Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).87 Despite the lack of any 
binding agreements on integration and the early stage of the discussions, trade unions and NGOs 
have used the APEC forums to gather to express solidarity, and to make clear at a very early 
stage of the discussions that any economic integration must include provisions to protect workers 
and the environment. Following the Manila People’s Forum in November, 1996, those 
assembled issued a Plan of Action that included a demand to the governments of APEC countries 
to honor their existing international commitments, including ILO Conventions ratified, and to 
“respect, enforce and improve national laws protecting human and labor rights, and where these 
laws do not meet international standards, to amend them and bring them into compliance.”88 
Addressing a particular concern in Asia, the Plan requires that “informal sector workers, 
migrants, farm workers and free trade zone workers must be included within labor laws and 
governments must inform migrant workers of their legal rights.”89 The challenges of integrating 
the extremely diverse economies and cultures of the Pacific basin are enormous. The APEC 
process must also be viewed as a crucial challenge for advocates for social justice to use the 
lever of trade to improve labor rights enforcement in countries of Asia that represent some of the 
most repressive regimes in the global economy.    
 
5. Concluding Summary of Regional Trade Agreements.  
 
                                                 
87 See generally, APEC: Four Adjectives in Search of a Noun, (1996)(Copy on file with ILRF). 
88 Plan of Action, Manila People’s Forum on APEC at p. 4 (November 21-23 (1996)(Copy on file with 
ILRF). 
89 Id. 
A review of regional labor rights regimes reveals a rich variety of mechanisms for 
implementing labor rights in trade. The European Union has elaborated an extensive social 
charter, including free movement of workers, and has a mechanism for enacting Europe-wide 
legislation through Directives in selected labor rights areas. A European Parliament provides a 
democratic political voice for EU citizens, even though its functions are basically advisory rather 
than legislative.  
 
The European Court of Justice takes up labor rights cases, and has succeeded in changing 
some domestic laws that  conflict with EU Directives. The Works Council Directive promotes 
Europe-wide consultation between employers and workers, which might contain seed of Europe-
wide collective bargaining.  
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Mercosur has not adopted either a social charter of the European type, or a statement of 
principles like that of the NAALC. However, Southern Cone unions have drafted and promoted a 
complete Social Charter, and the Southern Cone countries have established an innovative 
mechanism for the participation of trade unions and other social groups in the Economic and 
Social Consultative Forum, and in Working Group 10 on Labor Relations, Employment, and 
Social Security. Mercosur also established a Joint Parliamentary Commission giving a voice 
(non-binding) to elected representatives in the region. The Mercosur unions are also taking the 
lead in demanding a Labor Forum equivalent in status to the Business Forum in negotiations on a 
hemispheric free trade agreement. 
 
The NAALC provides an extensive set of Labor Principles that prepare the ground for a 
social charter even while domestic sovereignty over labor law matters is preserved. It provides 
for a broad, flexible program of international reviews, consultations, evaluations, and possible 
arbitrations on questions of domestic labor law enforcement, with many opportunities for 
participation by trade unions and allied groups.  
 
All the regional systems have critical weaknesses, too. The Social Charter has not halted 
the drive toward U.S.-style “flexibility” in employment relations. The EU continues to preclude 
rights of organizing, collective bargaining, and strikes from treatment by Europe-wide 
Directives.. The NAALC precludes the same subjects from independent evaluation or arbitration, 
and avoids setting common international standards and specific remedies for labor rights 
violations. The Mercosur labor rights framework is limited to consultation and recommendations 
with no binding effect. In all three regimes, the focus is on the actions of governments rather 
than on actions of the multinational corporations that violate workers’ rights. 
 
The European Union has taken more than 40 years to reach its current, still-flawed social 
charter. NAFTA and Mercosur countries have just begun experimenting with new instruments 
addressing the labor rights-trade linkage. The strengths and weaknesses of various regional labor 
rights regimes provide a rich field for analysis and dialogue among labor rights advocates along 
North-South, North-North, and South-South axes. Such a dialogue can move us beyond 
generalized demands for high labor standards toward a concrete, practical agenda to implement 
labor rights in trade. If labor rights advocates see the EU, Mercosur, and NAFTA labor rights 
regimes as “first drafts” of a worker rights-trade link, then we can begin developing a long-range 
strategy to improve them in future “drafts,” conscious that there is no finality — there is only 
continuing struggle — in the movement for labor rights in international trade. We now have 
sufficient experience, however,  to move towards agreement on a universal model for a social 
clause so that advocates can work in solidarity towards the same objective. Emerging regional 
trading blocs, such as FTAA and APEC, present immediate opportunities to improve upon 
existing models. 
 
D. The Substance of a “Labor Clause.” 
 
There is an emerging consistency on the substance of the “labor clause” to trade 
agreements. The debate really begins with how such a clause would be enforced internationally, 
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the topic of the next section. 
 
The most widely-accepted version of the labor clause has been proposed by the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), the international body of national 
trade union federations. The ICFTU’s proposal is to define the social clause based on key 
Conventions of the ILO, which have been ratified by most countries of the world. These are: 
 
· the right to associate (ILO Convention No. 87); 
 
· the right to organize and bargain collectively (ILO Convention No. 98); 
 
· equal employment opportunity and non-discrimination (ILO Convention Nos. 100 
and 111);  
 
· Prohibition of Forced Labor (ILO Convention Nos. 29 and 105); and  
 
· Prohibition of Child Labor (ILO Convention No.138).90 
 
                                                 
90 See, e.g., Social Charter for Democratic Development, ICFTU-APRO (1994). 
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This version of the labor clause is endorsed by most of the International Trade 
Secretariats, which are international groupings of trade unions on a sectorial basis. Two of the 
largest and most influential, the International Textile, Garment & Leather Workers Federation 
(ITGLWF), and the International Metalworkers Federation (IMF), have produced booklets to 
promote and explain this version of the social clause to their affiliates.91   
 
Perhaps most significant, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) has specifically endorsed a version of the labor clause nearly identical to that proposed 
by the ICFTU. In a recent publication, Trade, Employment and Labour Standards: A Study of 
Core Workers’ Rights and International Trade,92 the OECD advocates for inclusion of “core” 
labor rights, which are identified as freedom of association and the right of collective bargaining, 
prohibition of forced labor, prohibition of discrimination in employment, and prohibition of 
exploitative forms of child labor.93 The OECD characterizes these worker rights as part of 
“international jurisprudence concerning human rights.”94 Except for a refusal to endorse the 
ILO’s child labor convention (No. 138), the OECD Report expressly accepts the same ILO 
Conventions as the ICFTU in giving substance to the core labor standards.95 Regarding child 
labor, the OECD took issue with the ILO’s focus in Convention No. 138 with the age of the child 
                                                 
91 Enabling Workers to Share the Benefits of World Trade (ITGLWF) and Trade and Workers’ Rights – 
Time for a Link (IMF)( Both are on file at the ILRF). 
92 Published by the OECD in 1996 (Hereinafter OECD Report)(Copy on file at the ILRF). For a thorough 
and balanced critique of the OECD’s report, see Charnowitz, Trade Employment and Labour Standards: The OECD 
Study and Recent Developments in the Trade and Labor Standards Debate, 11 Temple International and 
Comparative Law Journal 131 (1997). 
93 OECD Report, supra note 32, at 26-27. 
94 Id. at 27.  
95 Id. at 33-36. 
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rather than the conditions under which children worked.96 The ILO now has a new Convention 
No. 187 on child labor that will focus on the most “intolerable” forms of child labor.97 Perhaps 
this will merge the ILO and OECD views. At this point, it is significant to note that the OECD 
has, for all practical purposes, proposed a social clause that is virtually identical to that proposed 
by the ICFTU. 
  
                                                 
96 Id. at 35-38. 
97 ILO, Child Labour, Targeting the Intolerable, International Labour Conference, 86th Session (1998).  
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Other proposed versions of a labor clause include minimum standards for health and 
safety and an acceptable minimum wage, based on the level of economic development of a 
particular country.98 This approach is consistent with the definition of “internationally 
recognized worker rights” contained in the provisions of U.S. law that link worker rights with 
various trade benefits,99 which includes “acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum 
wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health.”100 Likewise, the 11 Labor Principles 
of NAALC101 go well beyond the “core” labor standards and include issues of wages, health and 
safety, and migrant worker protections. 
  
There is some disagreement over the merit of including a working conditions provision in 
the social clause. Some argue that it fuels the “protectionist” objection to the social clause and 
reinforces the accusation that those in the North simply want to drive up wages in the South to 
protect Northern jobs. The response to this is that the proposal to include a minimum wage, for 
example, has always been stated firmly by worker rights advocates to be intended to set wages in 
the context of the level of economic development of the subject country, which would certainly 
allow for an extremely broad range of wages and would permit low wage countries to retain a 
significant comparative advantage. In the Bangladesh garment sector, for example, the monthly 
minimum wage set by law for an unskilled worker is 930 taka per month, approximately $23.102 
Virtually none of the workers in the garment sector received the minimum wage, and were 
instead paid 500 taka per month or less.  
 
                                                 
98 See, e.g., Brown, Goold, and Cavanagh, Making Trade Fair, World Policy Journal 325-26 (Spring, 
1992).  
99 See discussion at pages 7-10, supra. 
100 19 U.S.C. § 2462 (a)(4). 
101 NAALC, Annex 1. See discussion of the 11 Labor Principles at pages 18-19, supra. 
102 Collingsworth, Justice for Workers: A Manual for Enforcing the Labour Laws of Bangladesh 16-17 
(1995)(Published by the Bangladesh Independent Garment Workers Union, Dhaka, Bangladesh, and on file at the 
ILRF). 
The greatest danger for a developing country trying to improve wages and develop a 
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domestic economy is that a close competitor would try to undercut its labor costs to steal 
business, not that U.S. or European workers, who earn more than 50-100 times what 
workers in the least developed country earn, will successfully lure jobs back following a 
modest increase in the minimum wage. Thus, if Bangladesh wanted to raise its wage rates in 
the garment sector to $80 a month, but China, not bound to any social clause at this point, keeps 
its wages at $40, Bangladesh would no doubt lose business to China. Bangladesh’s decision to 
increase its minimum wage to $80 per month would certainly not cause a company to return its 
manufacturing to New York City, where even workers making the minimum wage earn at least 
$1000 a month. This reality was emphasized last year in Indonesia, when shoe manufacturers 
stated that if the country’s minimum wage continued to rise, they would shift operations to 
countries with lower wages.   
 
MNCs also use countries’ desires to maintain their “competitive advantage” to 
undermine trade union rights.  A union leader in the Philippines recently expressed his difficulty 
in organizing unions: “Our biggest problem here in the Philippines is job flight . . . As soon as 
we start to organize a union, the company threatens to move to Vietnam.”103  For this reason, it is 
crucial to include language protecting workers’ rights to associate in any social clause. 
 
It is thus in the interest of Bangladesh, or the Philippines, or any other country seeking to 
raise the standard of living of its people, to support a social clause with minimum standards to 
ensure that no country is able to win the race to offer the cheapest, most exploited labor in the 
world. Without a binding social clause to set a floor under which no country could go, the 
world’s poorest workers remain pawns in a “beggar thy neighbour” economy that only the 
MNCs are truly happy with.104  
 
                                                 
103 Walter Russell Mead, Labor’s New Power in Asia, Los Angeles Times, Opinion Section, M1 (February 
22, 1998).  
104 Greider, supra note 18, at 101. 
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Assertions that exploitative working conditions and extremely low wages are a natural 
step of economic development are misplaced.105 Early in this century when new industrial 
companies were struggling to develop, sweatshops were the norm. What has changed is that 
highly developed companies, like Motorola and Wal-Mart, are taking advantage of the 
undeveloped state of countries in the South to exploit workers until the countries do develop, 
and then they move on to another place and exploit a different group of workers. The only 
economic law at work here is that companies are looking for the lowest possible wages and the 
most docile workforce, not to survive a struggle to get a foothold in the market, but to maximize 
already impressive profits. Based on our research in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Thailand, and 
other evolving economies, there is little question that for most workers the minimum wage is the 
prevailing wage rate. Until trade unions are able to secure collective bargaining agreements for 
these workers that improve upon the minimum wage, it is important to emphasize just how 
crucial the wage issue is to most workers. We encourage an international process to develop a 
formula for determining a liveable wage, based on local economic conditions, and to incorporate 
this in the labor clause.106  
 
Whether to ultimately include a provision in a social clause setting minimum wages and 
conditions remains an economic, political and strategic decision that should follow careful 
discussion between the organizations participating in an alliance to promote the social clause.  
Likewise, whether to add environmental or other social provisions is a strategic question based 
on what can reasonably be accomplished. It should be noted, however, that at a people’s forum 
parallel to a governmental gathering in Brazil in May, 1997 to discuss the creation of a Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), there was an extraordinary showing of unity between 
unions and NGOs resulting in a broad declaration stating: 
 
There should be no FTAA agreement if it is to be created along the lines of other existing 
agreements, such as NAFTA. We need an agreement that promotes genuine development 
for all of the peoples of the hemisphere, one that recognizes and attempts to reduce the 
                                                 
105 See, e.g.,  Myerson, New York Times, Section 4, page 5, Column 1 (  June 22, 1997)  (describes the 
positions of Jeffery Sachs and Paul Krugman calling for more sweatshops as the answer to the “backbreaking 
poverty” of Africa). 
106 Richard Rothstein has prepared an excellent paper discussing the process for setting minimum wages 
based on local economic realities, Developing Reasonable Standards for Judging Whether Minimum Wage Levels 
are Acceptable (1996)(Copy on file with ILRF). 
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differences in levels of development, one that allows for integration of our economies 
based on democratically determined national development models, and one that is based 
on consensus. . . We are proposing an agreement designed for sustainable development 
rather than for trade liberalization. Any trade agreement should not be an end in itself, 
but rather a means towards combatting poverty and social exclusion and for achieving 
just and sustainable development.107 
 
                                                 
107 Declaration: Building a Hemispheric Social Alliance to Confront Free Trade, ¶ 1 (May 15, 1997)(copy 
on file at the ILRF).  
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The Declaration goes on to demand democratic participation in negotiating any FTAA,108 
and to require a social clause that includes protection for labor rights109 and the environment,110 
as well as provisions aimed at regulating capital flows,111 negotiating debt reduction,112 and 
resolving disputes over non-tariff barriers.113   The declaration was ultimately signed by the 
ICFTU’s Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers, the Alliance for Responsible Trade, 
which includes the ILRF and IPS, a number of significant NGOs, including the Mexican Action 
Network on Free Trade (RMALC), Common Frontiers (Canada), the Brazilian Association of 
NGOs (ABONG), the National Indigenous Council of Mexico, and the Canadian Association of 
Labor Lawyers.    
 
There are a number of other very compelling models for a social clause.114 As a function 
                                                 
108 Id at ¶ 2. 
109 Id at ¶ 3. 
110 Id at ¶ 4. 
111Id at ¶ 5. 
112 Id. 
113 Id at ¶ 6. 
114 See, e.g., the Philippines Declaration signed by NGOs in the APEC countries, which calls for a social 
clause that incorporates labor rights and a broad range of social issues (On file at ILRF).  
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of proposals made during the NAFTA debate, several organizations produced a document, A Just 
and Sustainable Trade and Development Initiative for the Western Hemisphere,115 which 
suggests five basic principles that should govern any trade agreement: respect for human rights, 
environmental and social sustainability, reduction of inequalities, democracy and open 
participation, and nonpreemption of government protections.116  Ultimately, a detailed plan for a 
social clause embracing worker rights, environmental protection, land reform, debt reduction, 
protection for rights of women and indigenous people, and democratic processes is proposed.117 
 
                                                 
115 Produced by the Alliance for Responsible Trade, Citizen Trade Campaign, and the Mexican Action 
Network on Free Trade (July, 19, 1994)(Copy on file at the ILRF). 
116 Id at 2-5. 
117 Id at 9-13. See also, Social Charters, Perspectives From the Americas, produced by Common 
Frontiers and the Latin American Working Group (1996)(Copy on file at the ILRF), which summarizes proposals for 
a social clause from various organizations in the Americas.  
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Again, inclusion of issues beyond the core labor standards must be resolved in the 
context of deciding which form of the clause has the best chance of becoming a reality. If, 
however, environmental and/or social NGOs are to be added to a “social clause” coalition, some 
provision to address their specific concerns will need to be included in the social clause that may 
require financial incentives to offset compliance.118  Perhaps the most fruitful approach would 
be to first agree on the components of the social clause and then engage in a prioritization 
process to phase in the list of rights across several years. As part of this discussion, 
development aid and debt reduction could be used to offset the costs incurred by a 
developing country as it phases in the rights of the social clause. The EU used a phase in 
approach with its GSP system, first activating prohibitions on forced or child labor, and then 
gradually phasing in other core labor rights.  
 
 The issue of development aid targeted to compliance with labor standards is an extremely 
important component of any effort to secure agreement internationally with a social clause.119  
To take one example, India, with at least 50 million child workers, could never sign on to a labor 
clause that included a prohibition on child labor.  Regardless of whether India could afford to 
solve its own child labor problem by reprioritizing available resources, India has no incentive to 
force its own compliance by supporting a labor clause.  To overcome present noncompliance, 
countries like India will require significant development assistance. 
 
To conclude on this issue, we refer to the negotiation process that occurred at Belo 
Horizonte in drafting the declaration. The ILRF and IPS participated in the discussion. There 
was remarkably little disagreement over what issues to cover in the labor clause. Generally, the 
organizations represented understood that any of the options would be an amazing victory if it 
could be included in the FTAA or other trade agreements. Virtually everyone accepted the 
reality that the proposal for a social clause must be “reasonable” to have any chance of being 
enacted. The issue that few had thought about carefully, but most acknowledged was the key 
question, was how the social clause would be enforced. This alone would determine whether the 
goals expressed in the substance of the clause would be realized. This would also determine the 
force of resistance from the MNCs and hostile governments. If there was little or no threat of 
enforcement, such as with the ILO Conventions, then those in opposition would not be overly 
concerned. If, however, the labor clause is designed with real teeth, then the opposition would be 
fierce. Also, to gain support of unions and NGOs in the South, these enforcement provisions 
must be carefully designed to ensure that the teeth are not used for protectionist purposes.120 The 
major challenge remains to have an enforceable mechanism that will allow workers to realize 
                                                 
118 It is beyond the scope of this article to develop the details of an environmental social clause. For an 
introduction to the issues, see H. French, Reconciling Trade and the Environment, in L. Brown et al, State of the 
World (Worldwatch Institute 1993). 
119 At an October, 1999 International Forum supported by the Ford Foundation to discuss this paper and the 
related papers by EPI and IPS, the need for targeted development assistance was emphasized by labor rights activists 
from the South as the key barrier to gathering support for the labor clause in their countries. 
120 See note 2 supra for concerns expressed by Martin Khor about protectionist uses of the social clause.  
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their rights. 
 
E. A Proposal to Enforce the Terms of a Labor Clause. 
 
1. Background Introduction. 
 
A labor clause, whatever the specific terms ultimately are, will make a concrete 
improvement in the lives of working people in the global economy only if there is an effective 
enforcement mechanism. This assertion is best illustrated by considering that the ILO, which  
will celebrate its 80th anniversary in 1999, has developed nearly universal labor standards, but 
has not played a significant role in alleviating worker exploitation in the modern global economy 
because it lacks enforcement power.121  Likewise, the Labor Principles provided in the 
NAALC,122 while comprehensive, have not been significantly advanced by the NAALC due to 
extremely weak enforcement provisions.123  
 
The labor clause, by its nature, raises issues of individual harm suffered by workers and 
their families as a result of the failure of employers to comply with labor laws set in domestic 
law and by international standards. Further, there is almost always an issue of a government 
failing to act to enforce properly the labor laws. A labor clause is thus designed to give voice and 
authority to workers, often against the combined power of governments and employers. This will 
only be realized if there is a democratic process to finalize the terms of any trade agreements to 
not only include a labor clause, but to ensure that the other provisions of the trade agreement 
support social and environmental sustainability. In other words, an enforceable social clause is 
not a panacea; trade agreements themselves should reflect a primary concern with 
improving the lives of people and protecting the environment.124 If, instead, a trade 
agreement permits widespread exploitation of workers and the environment, and it has some 
mechanism for seeking redress for harm that has already occurred, this is not a sensible path to 
sustainable development. This highlights why it is not advisable, therefore, simply to advocate 
using mechanisms that protect intellectual property in the WTO, for example, to protect the 
rights of workers. The WTO, as it is presently constituted, can not be trusted to protect the rights 
of workers because the government and MNC powers that created the WTO are the powers that 
workers need to be protected from.125  
                                                 
121 See, e.g. Ehrenberg, The Labor Link: Applying the International Trading System to Enforce Violations of 
Forced and Child Labor, 20 Yale Journal of International Law 361, 382 (1995). 
122 NAALC, Annex 1(1993). 
123 See, e.g., ILRF’s January 30, 1998 letter to the U.S. National Administrative Office, as part of the 
NAALC review process. (On file with the ILRF).  
124A Just and Sustainable Trade and Development Initiative for the Western Hemisphere, Alliance for 
Responsible Trade, Citizen Trade Campaign, and the Mexican Action Network on Free Trade (July, 19, 1994)(Copy 
on file at the ILRF). 
125 See Charnovitz, Trade Employment and Labour Standards: The OECD Study and Recent Developments 
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It is our hope that by the process for developing an effective enforcement mechanism for 
the labor clause, we will also stimulate debate in other areas, including among advocates for the 
environment and indigenous people, to ensure that we speak with one voice. Any future trade 
agreements must be negotiated using a democratic process with the aim of creating a new trading 
regime that deals with social issues as the primary objective of trade, rather than as a remedial 
afterthought, if at all. This was certainly the sentiment expressed by the assembled labor, human 
rights and environmental NGOs in drafting the Belo Horizonte Declaration.126  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
in the Trade and Labor Standards Debate, 11 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal at 160 
(1997)(noting that the WTO “is never going to be a good forum for pursuing the goal of higher labor standards”). 
126 See text at notes pages 29-30, supra. 
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As worker rights advocates managed to do in denying President Clinton “fast 
track”negotiating authority, one aspect of eventually achieving the goal of a labor clause is to 
block efforts to expand free trade agreements unless they reflect acceptance of the idea that trade 
should benefit people and protect the environment. The major task for proponents of a labor 
clause is to devise a politically-realistic enforcement model so that we can promote a positive 
agenda, rather than serve only in a reactive role. Further, it bears repeating what many argued 
during the original NAFTA debates: obviously increased global trade and economic integration 
are occurring at a rapid pace even if there are no new trade agreements.127 Doing nothing, or 
serving only a blocking role, will not halt global integration. We need to advance a clear 
alternative agenda. Each new trade agreement presents an opportunity to promote an alternative 
view of the trading system. 
 
Many organizations have implicitly or explicitly assumed that the ultimate goal is 
creation of a supranational enforcement body that oversees protection and enforcement of labor 
rights in the global economy by issuing binding remedial orders against offending governments 
and/or MNCs.128 The processes of this body would be democratic and transparent, and individual 
workers could file complaints to have their rights fairly adjudicated. While this may be a 
possible goal, it is not likely to happen in the near future. It is hard to imagine the major powers 
in the global economy, especially the U.S. and China, ceding significant national sovereignty to 
enforce worker rights to a supranational body.129  
 
There is room for a concrete series of steps to achieve an ultimate and more ideal result, 
but careful thought should be given to devising intermediate steps that are worth 
accomplishing in themselves. The discussion in this section will first provide an introduction to 
and context for the idea of an enforcement mechanism for the labor clause. We will then provide 
a recommended proposal which includes the key elements for effective enforcement. In the 
proposal we will identify areas where strategic choices need to be made between specific 
options. It is our goal to facilitate the development of agreement on a uniform enforcement 
mechanism that can be applied to virtually any trade agreement. Like the substance of the labor 
                                                 
127 Rothstein, Continental Drift: NAFTA and its Aftershocks, The American Prospect 68, 69-70 (Winter 
1993). 
128 This was evident in discussions at the Belo Horizonte meetings with trade unions and NGOs in May, 
1997 leading to the Belo Horizonte Declaration. See discussion in text at notes at pages 29-30, supra. 
129 See the discussion in the next session indicating the failure of efforts to include a social clause in the 
WTO. This is a strong indication of the long-term nature of any plans for global enforcement of worker rights. 
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clause itself, it is essential to develop consensus around a proposal for enforcement.  
 
2. Context for Seeking Enforcement of a Labor Clause in Trade Agreements. 
 
Until the WTO held its first Ministerial Conference and issued the Singapore Ministerial 
Declaration on December 13, 1996,130 most of the discussion for enforcing a social clause 
centered on inclusion of a social clause in the WTO.131  The ICFTU’s proposal for enforcement 
was to add a provision to the WTO Charter: 
 
The contracting parties agree to take steps to ensure the observance of the minimum 
labour standards specified by an advisory committee to be established by the WTO and 
the ILO, and including those on freedom of association and the right to collective 
bargaining, the minimum age for employment, discrimination, equal remuneration and 
forced labour.132 
 
This proposal would have tied the enforcement mechanism to the WTO, while giving the 
ILO responsibility for determining whether a country was in compliance with the labor 
standards. This was designed to capitalize on the strength and credibility of the ILO in 
identifying violations of its conventions, but keeping enforcement power at the WTO. This 
position was solidly endorsed by commentators as the best way to proceed.133  
 
The national trade WTO, however, soundly rejected the idea of a social clause and issued 
the following language relating to worker rights: 
 
                                                 
130 WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, Doc. No. 96-5315 (December 13, 1996). 
131 See generally, Ehrenberg, The Labor Link: Applying the International Trading System to Enforce 
Violations of Forced and Child Labor, 20 Yale Journal of International Law 361 (1995); Edren, Fair Labour 
Standards and Trade Liberalization, 118 International Labour Review 523 (1979). 
132 ICFTU Circular No. 38 at 3 (June 29, 1995)(Copy on file with ILRF). 
133 See, e.g., Ehrenberg, The Labor Link: Applying the International Trading System to Enforce Violations 
of Forced and Child Labor, 20 Yale Journal of International Law at 403-414 (1995). 
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We renew our commitment to the observance of internationally recognized core labour 
standards.  The International Labour Organization (ILO) is the competent body to set and 
deal with these standards, and we affirm our support for its work in supporting them. We 
believe that economic growth and development fostered by increased trade and further 
trade liberalization contribute to the promotion of these standards. We reject the use of 
labour standards for protectionist purposes, and agree that the comparative advantage of 
countries, particularly low-wage developing countries, must be in no way put into 
question. In this regard, we note that the WTO and ILO Secretariats will continue their 
existing collaboration.134 
 
The statement leaves no room for optimism that a labor clause will soon be a reality at 
the WTO. In a thorough assessment of the implications of the WTO’s position, Steve Charnovitz 
reports that subsequent statements by WTO officials restricted even further the WTO position.135  
For example, the former WTO Director General, Renato Ruggiero, clarified that the cooperation 
with the ILO would be limited to information exchange, such as whether ILO programs ran afoul 
of international trade rules.136 There should be no doubt then that the WTO is hostile to the idea 
of a social clause, there was virtually no support for the social clause at the Singapore 
Ministerial,137 and, as we noted before, it is our belief that even the well-publicized U.S. support 
was based on legislation requiring the U.S. to press for the social clause,138 but U.S. support was 
pro forma.139  The now famous “Battle in Seattle”, the Second Ministerial held in November, 
1999, confirmed the WTOs indifference to social issues, but, more important, demonstrated the 
widespread dissatisfaction with the current regime for managing the global economy. 
 
 The 1999 WTO Ministerial in Seattle also highlighted the need for stronger North/South 
dialogues.  While the U.S. trade negotiating team did agree to raise the idea of a working group 
on labor within the WTO, in exchange for AFL-CIO support for the overall negotiating agenda, 
the trade negotiators did little to ensure support for the idea from any developing nation.  Indeed, 
the U.S. team’s disregard for developing-nation input in the Seattle meetings led to a threatened 
walkout by sub-Saharan African delegates, furious at being excluded from key negotiations.  
This, perhaps to an even greater extent than actions in Seattle’s streets, led to a breakdown in the 
                                                 
134  WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, Doc. No. 96-5315, ¶ 4 (December 13, 1996).  
135  Charnovitz, Trade Employment and Labour Standards: The OECD Study and Recent Developments in 
the Trade and Labor Standards Debate, 11 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal at 156-58 
(1997). 
136 Id at 157-58. 
137 Id at 154. Charnovitz reports that the European Commission, Canada and Norway joined the U.S. in 
proposing a social clause.  
138 See text at note 39, supra. 
139 See pages 9-11, supra, for a discussion of the U.S. government’s unwillingness to enforce U.S. laws 
linking trade with worker rights. 
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meetings.  In such a context, the U.S. government cannot be relied upon to raise even the 
working group idea, let alone that of a social clause, in a manner that will gain widespread 
acceptance.  The push will have to come from somewhere else, and still requires much 
groundwork. 
 
Commentators continue to urge that the labor clause be implemented by a WTO/ILO 
collaboration,140 but this must now be viewed realistically as a long term goal that can only 
follow implementation on a regional level of trade agreements with a social clause. As 
Charnovitz put it, “[t]he stonewalling at Singapore should force a re-examination of strategy.” 
141Continuing to press member states for inclusion of the social clause in the WTO, as well as 
including democratic reforms to allow for meaningful participation by workers in the process, 
should remain a top priority.  In the near term, we first need to develop a universally-accepted 
enforcement mechanism that can be used in both regional trade agreements and, ultimately, at 
the WTO. There should be clear agreement on what interested organizations mean when they 
press for enforcement of a labor clause so that strategic energies can be spent working to gain 
acceptance for the idea, rather than continuing to debate internally what it is they want, allowing 
divisiveness to delay concrete action. 
 
3. Key Elements of an Effective Enforcement Mechanism for the Social Clause.  
 
The elements described below represent the key aspects of a mechanism designed to 
enforce the labor clause. It is our initial assumption, based on the discussion in the preceding 
section, that the immediate prospects for major change at the WTO are not good, and that an 
alternative should be to work immediately to ensure that any new regional trade agreements 
include an enforceable labor clause. Probably the most promising initial opportunity is in the 
                                                 
140 See, e.g., Wachtel, Labor’s Stake in the WTO, The American Prospect 34-38 (March-April 1998). 
141 Charnovitz, supra note 69, at 158-63. Charnovitz advocates giving the ILO enforcement powers, which 
could be provided consistent with its present charter. Id at 160. However, the tripartite character of the ILO would 
certainly make agreement to this within the ILO problematic. The very same nations that voted overwhelmingly to 
defeat a social clause at the WTO are unlikely to agree to give the ILO enforcement powers over the same issues. 
The resistance is not due to a belief that the WTO is the inappropriate forum, but to the idea of an enforceable labor 
clause. Certainly the employer representatives at the ILO would work to defeat an effort to give the ILO enforcement 
powers.    
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context of the FTAA, particularly given that trade unions and NGOs have already signed the 
Belo Horizonte Declaration.142 However, the approach here is to develop an enforcement 
mechanism that can be integrated with the labor clause into any trade agreement with minor 
modifications. Achieving enforcement of the labor clause through a series of regional trade 
agreements is a realistic goal, and one that offers the prospect of multiple experiments. As more 
and more major trading partners are covered by a labor clause, those countries already 
committed to the labor clause would have some incentive to support changes to allow for 
inclusion at the WTO level, along with democratic changes.  
 
                                                 
142 See pages 29-30, supra for a discussion of the Belo Horizonte Declaration. 
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Our recommendation for an enforcement mechanism does not require any radical 
changes for the countries involved. The most fundamental concept that must always be at the 
forefront of efforts to gain acceptance of an enforceable labor clause is that virtually every 
country in the world has domestic labor laws and has ratified international instruments, 
including ILO Conventions, that already require compliance with all of the terms of the 
labor clause.143 What’s lacking is enforcement, and the effort is to provide for labor laws what 
already exists for property rights in the global economy: a mechanism to ensure adequate 
enforcement. We believe, as was discussed earlier,144  that the major barrier to enforcement of 
labor laws in the global economy is that individual countries fear that if they require MNCs to 
comply with the law, the companies will flee to another country that will offer greater freedom 
from regulation. A major objective of the labor clause is ultimately to provide a worldwide floor 
for labor standards so that there can be no place that a company could flee to in order to avoid 
compliance. Thus, the provisions proposed below are designed to achieve what most countries 
are already legally bound to do: compliance with the terms of the labor clause. The powerful 
dynamic for enforcement will be to provide incentives for each country to cooperate in 
obtaining compliance by MNCs with the labor clause and corresponding domestic laws.  
 
We believe that all of the elements discussed below are essential, but there are several  
options for achieving the objective of a given element. Those choices must be resolved as part of 
an overall political strategy, and are highlighted here to facilitate debate and resolution among 
advocates for a social clause. Sample language is offered in discussing some elements in order to 
better illustrate the concept. Our intention is to facilitate discussion towards agreement on an 
enforcement mechanism that can become part of a universal effort by unions and NGOs to speak 
with one voice in pressing for an enforceable social clause. 
 
 a. Compliance with the labor clause as a condition to participation in the trade 
agreement. Regardless of whether we are talking about admission to the WTO or to a new 
regional agreement, such as the FTAA, a firm principle must be that all countries seeking to 
participate in the trade agreement must be in compliance with the clause as a condition to 
membership. Each country would participate in an extensive review of its law and practice to 
determine compliance with the standard. If a country is found not to be in complete compliance, 
it could have probationary membership, provided it agrees to implement specific reforms within 
two years, for example, subject to ongoing monitoring. The necessary revisions to law and 
practice could be identified as part of participation in the harmonization process discussed in the 
next section. If at the end of the two-year period it fails to be in complete compliance, then its 
membership in the trading group would be terminated with the right to reapply only when there 
                                                 
143 The Southern Cone trade unions made this a primary argument for uniform labor standards and 
documented the ILO Conventions that had been ratified by all of the participating countries. See discussion at pages 
15-17, supra. China and Vietnam are notable and significant exceptions. Neither have ratified the key Conventions, 
nor do their domestic labor laws adequately protect the core labor rights. For a list of ILO Convention ratifications 
by country, see ILO, Lists of Ratifications by Convention and by country, Report III (Part 5)(1995)  
144 See page 28, supra. 
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is complete compliance with the labor clause.  
 
Issues to Be Resolved: 
 
i. Who determines compliance with the labor clause? Ideally, this would be something 
the ILO could do. Certainly, in the context of an agreed format by the participating nations, the 
ILO is well-suited to assessing whether any given country is in compliance with core ILO 
Conventions. Indeed, the ILO already performs this function to a certain degree through its 
annual review of members’ compliance with ratified conventions.145 Further, when there are 
persistent problems with a particular country’s compliance with one or more conventions, there 
is a procedure to create a Commission of Inquiry to investigate fully.146 The ILO thus has the 
experience and mandate to perform this function.147 If, however, the ILO declines to participate, 
or the process for getting its cooperation is too cumbersome, or, as some assert, the ILO is too 
lethargic to play a constructive role in international worker rights enforcement, then the subject 
trade agreement could assemble its own panel of experts to make these determinations.148 The 
                                                 
145 Art. 22, Constitution of the ILO. 
146 Id.  at Art. 26. 
147 Charnovitz, Trade Employment and Labour Standards: The OECD Study and Recent Developments in 
the Trade and Labor Standards Debate, 11 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal at 160-63 
(1997)(discussing the ILO’s unique qualification to assess compliance with its Conventions). 
148 Further concerns are whether the ILO could in fact perform all of the functions required in enforcing the 
social clause and whether giving the ILO enforcement powers would cause employer and government 
representatives to take concerted action to dilute the standards set by the Conventions, which to date have been more 
viewed as of academic interest since there is no threat of enforcement. 
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committee could be drawn from a balance of labor ministry staff from the participating countries 
and outside experts, or, as was agreed to in the NAALC, could be made up entirely of credible, 
outside experts.149 Likewise, trade unions participating in Mercosur have proposed using a 
“Committee of Specialists” to evaluate compliance with social standards.150   Whatever its 
composition, for the remainder of this discussion, the body will be referred to as the “Panel 
of Experts.”151 
 
                                                 
149 NAALC Arts. 23-24. In limited cases, the NAALC allows for the formation of an “Evaluation 
Committee of Experts.” 
150 See pages 16-17, supra. 
151 If the labor clause evolves into a broader social clause that includes environmental standards, then the 
Panel of Experts would need to include experts in this field as well. 
ii. Can a country not in compliance participate in the trade agreement on a probationary 
basis while implementing a plan to get into compliance? We recommend that there be a 
probationary period and suggest two years as a reasonable period to make significant progress. 
The reason for the recommendation is simply to acknowledge the reality that most countries will 
not be in complete compliance, and allowing a probationary period will provide some incentive 
to participate in making progress. This also reflects our view that trade agreements represent an 
opportunity to make progress on worker rights. If the standard for participation is too high, then 
the result will be that there will not be any trade agreements and no opportunities to make 
progress. Assuming this approach is accepted, the idea then is to have the Panel of Experts draft 
a very specific work plan to bring the country into compliance with the social clause, including 
specific recommendations for reform of labor laws and improving enforcement mechanisms.  A 
major part of the plan should be evaluation of what development assistance is necessary to 
secure compliance.  It should be very clear that the failure of a country to comply with 
implementation of the plan within the two year probation period will result in automatic 
expulsion with the option of reapplying only when there is complete compliance. No country 
will take its obligation seriously if there is a regular pattern of extending time.   
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b. Participation in a process to harmonize laws upwardly to be consistent with the 
social clause . The premise of the social clause is that one or more of the countries participating 
in the trade agreement either does not have adequate laws or is not enforcing its laws. Otherwise, 
a social clause would not be necessary. In order to emphasize that the individual countries 
maintain primary responsibility for ensuring the conditions of the social clause, to allow for 
unique national solutions, and to avoid creating new multilateral institutions that exist in 
perpetuity, a process of upward harmonization is recommended. More fundamentally, this will 
reduce concerns of loss of national sovereignty by emphasizing that the primary intent is to 
encourage countries to rapidly improve their own enforcement processes to assume 
responsibility for upholding the law. This will, if taken seriously, require each country to adjust 
its laws and enforcement mechanisms upwards and to assume direct responsibility for 
enforcement of the provisions of the social clause. This is one of the major strategies for 
achieving implementation of the European Economic Community Treaty152 and was also 
advanced as a key aspect for the social charter proposed for Mercosur153 and by trade union 
advocates at the APEC People’s Summit.154 This is in sharp contrast with NAFTA, which, in the 
NAALC, precluded review of or changes to the domestic labor law of the signatories.155  
 
                                                 
152 See, e.g., Stone, Labor and the Global Economy: Four Approaches to Transnational Labor Regulation, 
16 Michigan Journal of International Law 987, 997-1004 (1995). 
153See discussion at pages 15-17, supra. 
154 See discussion at pages 23-24, supra. 
155 See NAALC, Art. 3 (1) requiring that “[e]ach Party shall promote compliance with and enforce its own 
labor law . . .”  The Labor Principles of Annex 1 specifically “do not establish common minimum standards for [the 
parties’] domestic law.” 
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Achieving harmony among the relatively similar economies of the European Community 
is significantly different from attempting to unite the Americas with the extremely diverse levels 
 of economic development, but harmonization should be accepted initially as the ultimate goal. It 
is important to add, however, that with respect to the issue of minimum wages, or other issues 
that are based on relative economic condition, we are not suggesting that standards be 
harmonized to be identical.156 The issue would be whether there is a minimum wage, for 
example, that meets the standard in the given country. As noted earlier,157in many developing 
countries, the minimum wage is the prevailing wage, so for most workers having the minimum 
wage also be a liveable wage, based on local economic conditions, is the most immediate 
concern that they have. This should be a key concern of the harmonization debate. Another issue 
that must be specifically addressed is whether the laws of a given country provide for sufficient 
remedies and penalties to encourage compliance by employers.  
 
A further principle of harmonization is that countries that lack resources and 
capacity to improve the enforcement of labor laws must be provided with direct assistance 
to support these activities and offset the costs of compliance.  This ned goes well beyond 
compliance with law.  For example, a country with a serious child labor problem ould need 
targeted assistance to remove children from the workforce and place them in schools.  This is a 
form of development aid that could actually lead to concrete and sustainable development 
benefits for working people. 
 
Issues to Be Resolved: 
 
i. Who participates in the harmonization planning process? Certainly, representatives of 
the member countries should be participants, but there should also be direct participation from 
concerned organizations, as well as from acknowledged experts. Perhaps the Panel of Experts 
could provide staff resources for the harmonization process, since the inspections will reveal the 
precise issues to be addressed with harmonization. There should also be participation from labor 
unions, NGOs, and employers. 
 
ii. How long should the harmonization process take? The ultimate decision on this issue 
depends upon which group of countries is involved. If the entire world is participating through a 
reformed WTO process, for example, that would obviously require a much longer period than 
adding another country to NAFTA. It is essential however, to have a clear time frame with 
specific steps beginning with assessing the laws that need to be improved, amending the laws, 
and then fully enforcing the new laws. If the subject countries have already agreed to be bound 
by the social clause, then amending and implementing changes to domestic law to be in 
compliance with the social clause should not require any major changes in the way things are 
done and therefore should not require an overly lengthy period of time. This is particularly true 
since most countries already have adequate laws to satisfy the labor clause and the adjustments 
                                                 
156 See pages 27-29, supra for a discussion of inclusion of a minimum wage in the social clause. 
157 Id. 
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will only need to be made to secure enforcement.     
 
c. Participation in an information audit by companies operating in more than one 
country of the trade area. There must be a firm recognition that employers, not governments,158 
initially deny workers their rights, and then the role of government is to enforce the law. A major goal for 
effective enforcement of a social clause is to develop a way to regulate the employment practices of 
companies operating in the countries bound by the social clause. Most of the problems relating to a 
denial of the rights created in the social clause would be solved  if companies respected the law.  
 
In order to have a basis for monitoring the activities of companies, more information is 
needed. This process can be initiated by requiring as part of the enforcement mechanism for a 
social clause that all participating countries must cooperate in developing an annual Labor 
Information Audit of businesses operating in two or more of the trade agreement countries. The 
audit would be conducted by independent monitors, and would be required of any company that 
seeks to export or import within the area covered by the trade agreement. The companies would 
be required to report information pertaining to all of their operations, whether under their own 
corporate form or through subsidiaries, joint ventures, contractors, or other business forms. The 
information would include: a) location, b) total number of employees, categorized by job 
classification and pay grade, c) wages paid for each job classification and/or pay grade specified 
by form of payment (i.e., hourly, daily, weekly, monthly etc. or average wages for piecework), d) 
total benefits provided to all individual or group of employees, present unionization status of any 
employees specifying the name of the union, number of represented employees, status of, and a 
copy of the most recent, collective bargaining agreement, affiliation of union with any central 
labor body or confederation, e) health and safety records, and f) some record of employment 
practices that might violate the law in one or more trade area countries. The information would 
be publicly available to inform governments and organizations seeking to enforce domestic laws 
or the provisions of the social clause. 
 
Issues to Be Resolved: 
 
i. Who would conduct the audits? To ensure credibility, the audits must be done by 
“independent” auditors.159 Whether this includes representatives from the respective 
governments is optional, but it would be desirable to improve the enforcement capacity of 
government inspectors. The Panel of Experts could certainly be recruited to survey the 
companies as well, but if the ILO is ultimately selected to serve as the Panel of Experts, it would 
not necessarily be the ideal group to survey employers. Perhaps a body of independent experts 
within each country could be appointed to focus exclusively on performing the annual labor 
audit.  The ILO could play an important role in providing uniform information and/or training to 
these national bodies, to facilitate standardization of reviews.   
                                                 
158 Of course governments, when acting as employers, can and do violate their own labor laws. 
159 See discussion in section III(C)(2) below of the need to have independent monitors for implementing 
Codes of Conduct. 
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ii. How to require company compliance. There will have to be some commitment by the 
governments to mandate company compliance as part of the trade agreement. This should 
include a thorough audit of each country’s labor laws to clarify employer obligations under the 
law. 
iii. What is the result if a company is found in the audit to be violating either the labor 
laws or the social clause? Any violation of the labor laws discovered in the audit should be 
reported to the country where the violation occurred. There should be a process for monitoring to 
ensure that the country took action to enforce the law. Violations of the social clause by 
companies are dealt with in the next two provisions. 
 
d. Require that companies operating in more than one country of the trade area 
must comply with the terms of the social clause.  The audit described in part c, above, is designed 
to develop information to promote better compliance with labor standards. However, in order to ensure 
that companies comply with the law, they should be required to abide by the terms of the social clause, in 
addition to the labor laws in the countries where they operate. This is not a radical proposition.  The 
OECD160 and the ILO161 have both called for developing codes of conduct for MNCs that 
incorporate similar substantive standards as the proposed social clause. Binding the companies to 
the social clause would provide an alternative, albeit more mandatory, mechanism for ensuring 
company compliance. This provision is essential to clarify the responsibility of MNCs in 
participating in efforts to improve respect for labor laws. Once harmonization occurs following 
completion of part b above, compliance with the provisions of the social clause would be 
redundant with compliance with the labor laws.   
 
Issues to Be Resolved: 
 
i. What is the relationship between obligations created by the social clause and any effort 
to develop a binding code of conduct?162 It is important not to create conflicting obligations for 
the companies. The best course would be to view Codes of Conduct as offering a private 
regulatory system to further ensure compliance with the social clause. 
 
                                                 
160 OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (1996). 
161 ILO, Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy 
(1996).  
162 See section III below for a complete discussion of codes of conduct. 
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ii. What is the scope of coverage for a company’s responsibility? Should it extend to the 
subcontractor level? Since an increasing percentage of global production is done by 
subcontractors, it would seem essential to hold the buyer-company responsible for the conditions 
of production for products it sells. This issue is also central to the debate on codes of conduct.163  
 
                                                 
163 See discussion at page 54, supra. 
ii. What happens if a company refuses to agree to be bound by the social clause? There 
could be a discussion about a grace period for companies that cannot comply immediately due to 
the need to make comprehensive changes in the way they operate. That could be a legitimate 
issue. However, for companies that simply refuse to cooperate, the penalty should be the same as 
for companies that are found to have violated the social clause, discussed in part e below. 
 
e. Remedies following a violation of the social clause by a member country and/or a 
company operating within a member country.  This, of course, is ultimately the issue that will 
cause resistance to participation by governments. Whether it is the U.S. or Haiti, no government 
wants another authority to have enforcement power over it. This provision will necessarily be 
more complex. To facilitate discussion, suggested language will be offered to accomplish the key 
points.  
 
Notice of Violation. To leaven the perception that the social clause will override national 
authority we must constantly emphasize that any penalty imposed against a participating 
government would  flow from a voluntary trade agreement that all member states have agreed to 
abide by that imposes substantive standards in the labor clause that each country is already 
bound to through domestic labor law, or international instruments, including ILO Conventions. 
The power to avoid penalties rests with the member states’ ability to avoid violations. To 
emphasize strongly this point, the first clause of the remedy provision should require notice and 
opportunity to correct: 
 
Prior to any investigation or hearing of any sort under this or any other provision, any 
complaint submitted to the Panel of Experts that a party has violated any provision of 
the social clause must be provided to the appropriate authority of that party in writing 
with any documentation. No action may be taken by the Panel of Experts, nor any 
penalty imposed, nor will the allegation be considered a violation for purposes of 
cumulating violations,  if the party that is the subject of the allegation addresses the 
allegations to the satisfaction of the complaining party within 30 days of the provision 
of notice.  
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Penalties for Failure to Correct Violations of the Social Clause. If a country fails to 
remedy a violation of the social clause, which would normally mean it refuses to enforce its 
laws, there must be a system of penalties to encourage compliance. There should be a clear 
recognition that normally the government doesn’t violate the rights protected directly, but is 
charged with enforcing the law with respect to companies operating within its territory. Given 
that each country will have, by necessity, passed an assessment of compliance with the social 
clause as per part a, above, to qualify for participation in the trade agreement, there should not be 
too many issues of inadequate law. Penalties directed at companies, with the cooperation of 
the host government, will resolve most problems. The penalties therefore should be designed 
to encourage enforcement. Again, this leaves solving the problem within the firm control of the 
individual governments and allows them to act to prevent any protectionist use of the social 
clause.164 If a country ultimately refuses to enforce its own laws as per the commitment made in 
accepting the social clause, then the remedy must be exclusion from the trade agreement and the 
corresponding benefits. The following provision is an effort to accomplish these objectives: 
     
Any products found by the Panel of Experts to be made in violation of any of the 
provisions of the social clause shall be deemed to be tainted products that may not be 
shipped within the trade area. Following such a finding, all member countries have the 
right to ban immediately the importation of that product from the country that was the 
subject of the finding. Alternatively, the countries could impose a tariff on the product 
to reflect the unfair cost advantage of producing the product in violation of the social 
clause. If it is not practical to identify within a class of products which items were 
made in violation of the social clause, all products within the class are subject to the 
ban unless the producer can demonstrate with satisfactory evidence that his or her 
products were not made in violation of the social clause. 
 
Any party to the trade agreement, or any person or organization adversely affected by a 
violation of the social clause, may bring a formal complaint to the Panel of Experts 
within one year of the occurrence of the last act constituting a violation. In order for a 
country that is a party to the agreement to bring a complaint to the Panel of Experts, 
that country must itself be in full compliance with the social clause. The Panel of 
Experts, which shall develop its own rules of procedure to be submitted for approval to 
the parties to the trade agreement, must hold a public hearing on all complaints and 
must resolve all complaints with a written opinion within 180 days of the filing date. 
 
Following a finding by the Panel of Experts that there was a violation of the social 
clause, the country where the violation occurred shall immediately institute 
proceedings to enforce the law with respect to the company or entity identified as 
denying the rights of the social clause. The country shall file with the Panel of Experts 
monthly reports, available for public inspection, indicating steps being taken to enforce 
the law.  In no case shall the enforcement process at the first level of adjudication 
                                                 
164 This will hopefully address concerns that the social clause could be misused for protectionist purposes. 
See note 2, supra.   
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available in the country take more than six months to complete.  
 
In any case in which a single company, and for purposes of the social clause a single 
company includes all subsidiaries or other entities under its direction or control, is the 
subject of more than two findings by the Panel of Experts of a violation of the same 
provision of the social clause within a one year period, whether or not the violation 
occurred in the same country of the trade area, the third violation will be deemed a 
systematic failure to comply with the law. The company will be suspended from the 
benefits of the trade agreement for a period of one year, and all products produced by 
the company within the trade area must be subject to tariff treatment by all member 
countries as if they were produced outside the trade area and may be subject to any 
other trade sanctions any country within the trade area wishes to impose. Appropriate 
steps must be taken by member countries to prevent transshipments of products 
through a non-sanctioned company. After a one year period, the company may apply to 
have the suspension lifted and must then participate in a new audit as per part (c) 
above to determine whether the company is in complete compliance with the social 
clause. 
 
In any case in which a member country is the subject of more than two findings by the 
Panel of Experts of failing to enforce the same provision of the social clause within a 
one year period, whether or not the violation concerns the same company or entity, the 
third violation will deemed a systematic failure to enforce the law and the country will 
be suspended from the benefits of the trade agreement, allowing all other countries to 
adjust tariffs or otherwise impose sanctions as if the subject country was not a party to 
the trade agreement. This penalty will also apply in any case in which a country fails to 
comply with any of the affirmative requirements of this enforcement provision to 
provide information to the Panel of Experts or otherwise cooperate in obtaining 
enforcement of the social clause. If the violations are specific to a particular sector of 
the economy, the Panel of Experts may opt to impose the penalty only with respect to 
that sector. After a one year period, the country may reapply for membership through 
the provisions of part (a) above. 
 
Issues to Be Resolved: 
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All of the issues addressed in the recommended language should be thoroughly debated 
to identify the best options. Some general explanation may be helpful in focusing the discussion. 
The emphasis is on respecting national sovereignty by acknowledging that countries must have 
the primary responsibility for enforcing laws within their territory, and the social clause serves as 
a backup device, as well as a monitoring instrument. There are significant opportunities for 
countries to avoid penalties, first by requiring notice and an opportunity to correct, then by 
permitting up to two violations before permitting penalties for systematic violations, assuming 
the country otherwise cooperates in resolving the first two violations. Whether this standard 
should be higher or lower is certainly something that should be thoroughly debated. Further, we 
recommend penalties focused on removal of trade benefits with the possibility of banning the 
tainted products from trade. The permissible remedies should be the focus of special attention in 
discussions. There certainly are other options, including monetary fines. We have tried to 
propose a reasonable mechanism that would not be viewed as too onerous by countries. It seems 
fair that the trade agreement provides specific benefits for countries that comply with the 
provisions, including the social clause, and that countries will lose these benefits if they violate 
the provisions. Likewise, with respect to companies, penalties are designed to achieve 
compliance and provide an incentive to cooperate to avoid suffering loss of market access.    
 
 
   III. Developing Codes of Conduct with Independent Monitoring 
Systems to Improve Labor Rights Enforcement.  
 
A. Introduction and Background. 
 
As noted earlier in this paper, a number of private enforcement initiatives directed at 
corporations, rather than governments, have been proposed in recent years as alternatives or 
complements to bilateral labor rights clauses in trade agreements and regional social charters.  
These initiatives attempt to address directly the problem of employer violations of labor rights 
worldwide. 
 
Corporate codes of conduct and mechanisms to enforce them provide a means to identify 
and address worker rights violations using consumer pressure, without directly relying on either 
individual government or international legal enforcement mechanisms.  However we recognize 
that approach is limited to certain consumer-oriented MNCs with high profile brand names.  
Ultimately, therefore, the approach cannot be a substitute for the broader project of enhancing 
international labor standards and their enforcement.  
    
In response to a flurry of exposes about inhumane conditions in the production of big-
name consumer items – especially garments, footwear, and toys – a number of MNCs which 
have significant elements of their corporate value tied up in name identification have turned to 
the strategy of adopting and publicizing corporate codes of conduct.165   Typically, such codes 
                                                 
165Campaigns to influence corporate behavior have employed various strategies, from shareholder 
resolutions to lawsuits.  Promoting codes of conduct are only one among these strategies.  For a discussion of the 
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stress the company’s commitment to good environmental practices, to prohibiting forced labor 
and child labor, to fair and safe working conditions for employees, variously defined, and to non-
discrimination for reasons of gender, race, or other factors not relevant to the performance of 
work.  A few of these corporate codes go further, attesting to the company’s commitment to 
recognize their employees’ right to form trade unions and to bargain collectively.166  
 
Nevertheless, codes of conduct and independent monitoring initiatives can play an 
important role in breaking new ground on labor rights enforcement, and thus paving the way for 
proposed mechanisms outlined in the previous section.  In particular, they have played a useful 
role in mobilizing large numbers of consumers and workers to fight for better implementation of 
international labor standards. 
 
History 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
corporate accountability movement, see Broad and Cavanagh, “The Corporate Accountability Movement: Lessons 
and Opportunities,” paper prepared for the World Wildlife Fund Project on International Financial Flows and the 
Environment, on file at IPS and ILRF. 
166For a sampling of these codes, see Appendix A. 
Efforts to promote codes of conduct began in the 1970s.  Revelations of the involvement 
of ITT and other U.S. corporations in the bloody coup against the Allende government in Chile 
in 1973, and of huge bribes paid by the Lockheed Corporation to Japanese political figures to 
gain military contracts in 1975, led to a movement by NGOs and governments of developing 
countries to demand greater corporate accountability.  In 1975, the United Nations created a 
Commission on Transnational Corporations which set out to negotiate a UN Code of Conduct on 
Transnational Corporations.  However, during the 1980s, the UN Commission found it 
impossible to develop any mechanisms to make this code relevant, or even to research the level 
of compliance by companies or countries with the terms of the codes.  By the end of the decade, 
the Commission itself was virtually without funds and unable to carry out even a modicum of its 
original mandate.   Under strong pressure from the US government, it was dismantled in the 
early 1990s.   
 
In 1976, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) passed 
guidelines on MNCs that recognize the rights of workers to organize and to bargain collectively. 
 However, this document only affects OECD countries, most of which already have strong trade 
union movements and relatively consistent enforcement of labor laws.  Furthermore it is 
voluntary and thus cannot be enforced. 
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In 1977, the ILO adopted a Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policy, a code which encompasses a broad range of rights and principles, 
and which furthermore includes a detailed complaint procedure which allows for an ILO 
Standing Committee on Multinational Enterprises to investigate a company’s practices.  
However, this code has no sanctions or other enforcement mechanisms, and the Standing 
Committee has been unable even to launch investigations.  In 1993 the committee received a 
request to review labor practices at a Pepsico bottling facility in Guatemala following severe 
harassment and intimidation of trade union members there.167  The employer representatives on 
the ILO Standing Committee blocked the request.  According to the committee report, the 
Employer Vice-Chairman stated “that the Employers did not perceive respect for human rights as 
a precondition for investment.  If that were the case, she argued, employers would not have 
accepted the Tripartite Declaration.”168 
  
                                                 
167Correspondence from the International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, 
Tobacco and Allied Workers’ Associations to the International Labor Rights Fund, on file at ILRF. 
168“Report of the Committee on Multinational Enterprises,” International Labour Office, Geneva March 1-4, 
1993. 
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Despite the failure of these attempts, pressure to create codes to regulate employer 
behavior worldwide grew.  During the 1980s, however, several academics and grassroots 
activists investigated and publicized reports of environmental, labor and land rights abuses by 
MNCs expanding into developing countries.169  By the early 1990s these investigations had led 
to public exposes of practices by several U.S.-based companies.  In 1991 jeans maker Levi-
Strauss was revealed to be using a contractor in the Northern Marianas, where young women 
from China and Thailand were being shipped in to work in factories under near-bonded 
conditions and denied any access to labor law protection.   Dismayed by the negative publicity, 
Levi-Strauss set out to implement a code of conduct both for its own operations and for those of 
its suppliers and contractors.  This was the first known example of a company code of conduct 
adopted as a means to combat both bad conditions and bad publicity.170  Shoemakers Nike 
International and Reebok International were the subjects of a series of reports starting in the 
early 1990s and continuing to the present day about labor rights abuses in shoe production 
facilities in China and Southeast Asia.171  Reebok responded by adopting the first code of 
conduct to contain language protecting the rights to associate freely and bargain collectively.172  
Walmart was the subject of a television expose that revealed that garments it retailed carrying a 
“Made in USA” label were actually produced with child labor in Bangladesh.  The National 
Labor Committee, a U.S> based NGO,  found and publicized the fact that the“Kathy Lee” label, 
owned by TV personality Kathy Lee Gifford, was being produced in factories in Honduras 
employing 13 year-old girls. 
 
These incidents were given further poignancy by the discovery in 1995 in El Monte, 
California of a factory producing garments for a number of name-brand U.S. companies that had 
kept 76 women workers from Thailand in a state of complete captivity for as much as seven 
                                                 
169e.g., Mies, Maria, The Lace Makers of Narsapur: Indian Housewives Produce for the World Market, 
London: Zed Press 1982 ; Nash, June, We Eat the Mines and the Mines Eat Us, New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1979; Ong, Aihwa, Spirits of Resistance and Capitalist Discipline: Factory Women in Malaysia, Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1987. 
170See Forcese, Craig, Commerce with Conscience?  Human Rights and Corporate Codes of Conduct, 
Quebec: International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, 1997. 
171See The Sweatshop Quandary, Washington: Investor Responsibility Research Center, 1998. 
172See Appendix A. 
 
 65 
years.  The realization that “globalization” had brought the worst possible Third World 
conditions home to the U.S. provided stark evidence of the need to challenge corporate behavior. 
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“No Sweat” Campaign.  Consequently, U.S. Labor Secretary Robert Reich reached out to the 
apparel industry, to trade unions and to non-governmental organizations to conceptualize 
answers to a growing dilemma: how to monitor and control corporate behavior in a situation in 
which governments, including the U.S. Government, have rapidly declining resources to inspect 
factories and punish violators, and where competitive pressures are narrowing margins of profit 
at the labor-intensive end of production.  The Department of Labor attempted to use publicity, 
both positive and negative, to induce reforms within the domestic industry.  Consistent violators 
of U.S. labor laws, particularly wage and hour regulations, were targeted in a quarterly list of 
violators.  On the other hand, the department established a “Trendsetter List”, highlighting for 
special commendation companies that were making particularly strong efforts to weed out labor 
abuses in their domestic facilities. This effort, while useful in a transition to serious enforcement 
of standards, also demonstrated its weakness when several “Trendsetter” companies were found 
to have serious violations in some of their subsidiary operations.  Also, as was pointed out by 
critics, the “Trendsetter List” only targeted domestic producers; the worst human rights 
violations in the garment industry still take place, despite the revelations about El Monte, in 
developing countries with weak labor regimes.  An international approach to codes of conduct 
and monitoring was clearly needed.  The outcome of the “No Sweat” Campaign was the creation 
of the Apparel Industry Partnership Fair Labor Association, to be described in the following 
section. 
 
B.  Model Initiatives. 
 
The biggest issue facing advocates for a code of conduct approach today is that of 
implementation.  How can it be ensured that companies or industries are obeying their own 
codes?  What kinds of sanctions can be applied for failure to implement?  Below are a few 
examples of specific initiatives to address the implementation issue.  While each of the examples 
below has its own unique history and problems, overall they may provide a basis for 
development of a broader implementation strategy. 
 
Rugmark.  Reports of bonded child labor amounting to virtual slavery in the carpet industries of 
India and Pakistan were displayed in shocking detail on European television in the mid-1980s.  
This news caused an immediate and potentially disastrous loss of sales of carpets from India in 
Europe, especially in Germany, the largest market for oriental carpets in the world.  Alarmed at 
the prospects of losing an important source of foreign exchange, Indian non-governmental 
organizations, together with export promotion agencies linking Germany to India, began to 
discuss appropriate means to market good corporate behavior in the making of rugs.  A number 
of labeling programs grew out of these discussions, including the Rugmark program.  The 
program was later implemented in Nepal, as well. 
 
Rugmark is a private, voluntary certification program founded in September, 1994.173  It 
                                                 
173This program is described in great detail in the report, “By the Sweat and Toil of Children Vol. IV: 
Consumer Labels and Child Labor,” US Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, 1997.  See 
also, P. Harvey,  “Rugmark: After One Year” (October,  1996)(Copy on file at ILRF). 
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is administered as a foundation.  The program aims to reduce the use of child labor in the 
industry and thereby avoid consumer boycotts.  It also seeks to improve the long-term prospects 
of children who are removed from jobs in the industry.  The program administers two systems of 
licensing, one for manufacturers and exporters and the other for importers and retailers in 
consuming countries.  Licensed parties are required to pay a licensing fee, which is used to cover 
inspections and monitoring, administrative costs, issuance of Rugmark labels and to provide 
funds to establish educational programs for children removed from carpet work. 
 
Inspections are carried out by professional Rugmark inspectors, and representatives of 
local NGOs are permitted to accompany inspectors at any time.  When child labor is detected, 
licensees are given one warning before they are sanctioned.  Once carpets are completed and 
ready for export, a carpet identification number is issued on a label affixed to the carpet, which 
allows the carpet to be traced back to the actual loom on which it was produced. 
 
As of December 1999, the Rugmark program had succeeded in licensing more than 180 
manufacturers and exporters in India, and had certified the export of one and a half million 
carpets from India and several thousand from Nepal.  Most of these were shipped to Germany, 
with smaller numbers reaching the United States, U.K, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, France, the 
Netherlands and Japan.  The Rugmark program had also succeeded in establishing seven schools 
in Nepal and India to rehabilitate former child workers.  A Rugmark Pakistan program has 
recently become operational. 
 
FIFA Code of Conduct/ILO Sialkot Monitoring Program.  The soccer ball industry, centered 
around the city of Sialkot in Pakistan,174 has come under fire in recent years for employing child 
workers.  Public attention to this issue led to the model Code of Labor Practice adopted in 
September, 1996 by the International Federation of Football Associations (FIFA), the world 
regulatory agency for soccer.   
 
FIFA already had a program of quality control in place to certify and label all balls used 
in international tournament play.  The organization collaborated with three trade union bodies:   
the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), the International Textile, 
Garment and Leather Workers Federation (ITGLWF), and the International Federation of 
Commercial, Clerical, and Technical Employees(FIET) to develop a code of conduct to be added 
to the quality control criteria for all goods bearing its logo.  The code that was adopted is perhaps 
the most comprehensive code of conduct among the many that have been proposed or developed. 
 This is due, in part, to the fact that no industry representatives were involved in its formulation.  
 Negotiated by labor unions and a regulatory agency with power to impose it on producers, this 
code could establish maximum standards without the need to compromise in order to gain 
adherence. 
 
Unsurprisingly, this code attracted considerable anxiety and animosity from the World 
                                                 
174Approximately 75 percent of all the world=s soccer balls are produced in the Sialkot area. 
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Federation of Sporting Goods Industries (WFSGI) when it was announced, leading to the 
formulation of a WFSGI Code, announced in early 1998, and to an effort to limit damage to the 
industry by a program to eliminate child labor from the making of soccer balls in Sialkot.  This 
program was negotiated between the ILO, UNICEF, Save The Children UK, and the Sialkot 
Chamber of Commerce, representing soccer factories.  Soccer ball manufacturers agreed to 
participate in a monitoring program sponsored by the ILO.  The program had the stated goal of 
eliminating child labor from the soccer ball industry in Pakistan within 18 months.  The program 
intended to provide former child workers with educational opportunities, so that they were not 
simply forced to work in another industry. 
 
In early 1999, a year into the program, independent researchers discovered that child 
labor still existed in the Sialkot soccer ball industry.175  Moreover, even according to the ILO=s 
own assessment of the program, the program was beset with a number of problems.  These 
included: 
 
$ Many manufacturers who signed onto the program had not paid dues or provided any 
details about their stitching centers. 
 
                                                 
175In late 1998, the Association of Network for Community Empowerment (ANCE), based in Lahore, 
Pakistan, conducted an independent investigation into the effectiveness of the ILO program.  A research team visited 
23 villages in the Sialkot region to determine whether or not children continued to work on soccer ball production 
either within village stitching centers or at home, and whether new educational opportunities had been offered to 
these children through the ILO program.  The ANCE report is on file at ILRF. 
$ Even participating employers were still using children in their stitching centers, and in 
home-based employment; the ILO is not empowered to apply any sanctions to these 
employers. 
 
$ Soccer ball production may be shifting from Sialkot to nearby, unregulated regions of 
Pakistan, and some children may be moving from production of soccer balls to 
production of surgical instruments. 
 
$ Schools established for soccer-stitching children may instead be serving other children, 
while former soccer stitchers are employed in other work. 
 
Despite these problems, the ILO indicated it was planning to expand the program to the soccer 
ball industry in India and initiate a similar program in the carpet industry in Pakistan.  
 
A major flaw in the ILO program is that it contains no sanctions for offending employers, 
nor any Areward@ for good behavior.  The program has explicitly been designed, as per the 
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desires of industry representatives to the process, so that it did not contain any social labelling 
component.  The ILO itself was reluctant to take on a labelling or certification role, although it 
has been willing to lend its affiliation, and the approval that affiliation implies, to the 
participating manufacturers and retailers.  Without a label or other means to identify to 
consumers manufacturers and retailers that comply with the program, there is little incentive to 
comply, and a serious problem, noted by the ILO=s own assessment, of a significant level of 
Afree riders@ to the program. 
 
For the program to work, it may be necessary to revisit the Partners= Agreement, and to 
strengthen it to include sanctions against manufacturers within the program who fail to comply 
with its commitments to cease employing children.  
 
SA8000.  Another response to the welter of demands for greater corporate accountability has 
been the Center for Economic Priorities= development of a code and monitoring system based 
on the ISO series of quality standards.  Called SA8000, this code to measure ASocial 
Accountability@ is an effort to provide standards that can be monitored by professional 
accounting firms to declare individual factories or work sites Asocially accountable,@ so that 
multinational firms can contract with them in the assurance that they have been declared 
acceptable.  The terms of the code are similar to others, and in some instances superior.  For 
example, the code calls clearly for payment of a Aliving wage@ and for reparations or 
rehabilitation funds to be paid to children who are laid off by companies in order to comply with 
the standards.     
 
A detailed analysis of the program by Janneke van Eijk of the European Clean Clothes 
Campaign noted several of the program=s flaws.176  Among issues raised were the fact that 
monitoring cannot simply be conducted on a periodic Aspot check@ basis, but must involve the 
establishment of reliable, permanent mechanisms through which workers can report problems 
and grievances; such mechanisms are lacking in the SA8000 plan.  
 
                                                 
176VanEijk, Janneke, AComments on the Guidance Document for Social Accountability 8000,@ Clean 
Clothes Network, December 1997. 
Another problem noted by van Eijk is the program=s focus on individual factories, rather 
than on retailers.  A participating MNC can apply for certification of a single factory, or handful 
of factories, and receive such certification even if the vast majority of its facilities or suppliers 
remain uninspected.  A company might thus choose to spotlight a model facility under the 
program, and receive the public benefit of such inspection, even when the vast majority of its 
production takes place under unregulated conditions.  While the program=s spokespeople have 
responded by noting that they provide certification only to factories, not to retailers, the overall 
Areport card@ approach of the Center for Economic Priorities may nevertheless convey to 
consumers the suggestion that a company has received, as a whole, a clean bill of health. 
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A final flaw of the program is that monitors must pay a fee to receive accreditation from 
the program, a process that many local NGOs may find prohibitive.  Although the program is in 
theory open to any sort of organization that may wish to be accredited as a monitor, to date 
monitoring has been carried out by a small handful of MNCs with expertise in financial auditing 
or the area of customs inspection, principally Societe Generale de Surveillance. 
 
The SA8000 scheme is likely to win some support among MNCs as being a consistent 
and relatively easily implementable approach.  However, treating labor rights as a Aquality 
control@ issue similar to other ISO standards is unlikely to appease critics of corporate behavior 
from the trade union and NGO communities.  Unlike verification of the quality of a product, 
independent monitoring of codes requires the establishment of relationships of trust between 
monitors and workers, as shall be described in the Issues section below.   
 
 Apparel Industry Partnership/Fair Labor Association.  In August, 1996, President Clinton 
threw his support behind an effort which, building on the ANo Sweat@ initiative, began to 
develop a cooperative code of conduct for apparel and footwear companies for both their 
domestic operations and their subsidiaries and suppliers all around the world.  This initiative is 
the White House Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP).  Initially composed of 10 major apparel 
and footwear companies, two unions and four civic groups (human rights, labor rights, religious 
and consumer organizations), the AIP presented its proposed code of workplace practices to 
President Clinton in April, 1997.  In addition to a code of conduct and a set of monitoring 
principles applicable both to internal company monitors and to external independent monitors 
(defined below), the report called for the creation of an organization which is to have 
responsibility for accrediting monitors, overseeing monitoring, educating the consumer public, 
and researching the causes of poor labor practices. The charter document for this new Fair Labor 
Association (FLA) was unveiled in November, 1998, and the association itself was incorporated 
as a nonprofit organization in 1999. 
 
The AIP represents an effort by concerned businesses and worker advocates to work 
together to develop labor standards for worldwide operations, and to implement these standards. 
 However, following the announcement of the FLA Charter in late 1998, the participating unions, 
the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE) and the Retail, Sales and 
Department Store Workers= Union (RSDWU)  pulled out of the partnership, as did the single 
representative from the ethical investment community, the Interfaith Center for Corporate 
Responsibility (ICCR).177  Not only these groups, but others in the US sweatshop activist 
community criticized the agreement reached in the charter document.  Primary criticisms focused 
on the level of monitoring178, on the fact that companies may select their preferred monitors from 
a roster of groups accredited by the FLA, and on what was considered to be inadequate language 
                                                 
177The representative from RSDWU, the union=s president emeritus Lenore Miller, later rejoined the FLA 
as a member to its NGO advisory council. 
178Ccompanies would be required to monitor 100 percent of their own facilities, and 30 percent of the 
facilities worldwide would be subject to independent monitoring. 
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on wages.179 
 
Despite these criticisms, the FLA became fully operational in 2000 with the hiring of an 
Executive Director, and the development of accreditation protocols for independent monitors. 
The next steps were to accept applications from organizations that wish to be accredited as 
monitors, and to develop full guidance for independent monitoring reporting.  In the meanwhile, 
two of the FLA partners have already experimented with NGO monitoring (described below in 
the section on single-company initiatives).  Another strength of the program is that it provides 
for the creation of a channel for third-party complaints to be filed against employers/retailers 
whose facilities are believed to be in violation of the code of conduct. 
 
The initiative still suffers from a number of weaknesses180, as well as some important 
open questions.  After three years, program participants had not yet reached agreement on the 
benchmarks for determining compliance on issues not fully defined by the code of conduct, or by 
international standards, such as definitions of sexual harassment, or the extent of benchmarks on 
occupational safety and health matters.  Also, the channel for third party complaints had not yet 
been established.  The decisions reached on these matters, as well as the initial implementation 
of independent monitoring under the program, will be the real tests of its success. 
 
Ethical Trading Initiative 
 
In early 1998, U.K.- based retailers and representatives of NGOs and trade unions came 
together to create the Ethical Trading Initiative.  The participants negotiated a model code of 
conduct, and began a series of pilot projects in Asia and Africa to determine how best to verify 
implementation of this code.  The approach differs significantly from the AIP in two regards.  
First, it is not restricted to a single industry; company participants include clothing retailers, food 
and beverage producers, a cosmetics company and others.181 
                                                 
179The AIP/FLA code of conduct mandates employers to pay either minimum or prevailing wages in the 
country of operation, whichever is higher.  Although the document references the need for wages to meet workers= 
basic needs, some groups, including ICCR, felt that companies should be made to commit to paying such wages, 
even when higher than minimum wage. 
180An assessment of the Charter Document=s strengths and weaknesses can be found on the ILRF website, 
at www.laborrights.org. 
181A full list of ETI participants is available on the ETI website, www.ethicaltrade.org/participants. 
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In 1999, ETI consolidated its organizational structure and entered discussions with NGO 
partners in developing countries regarding the implementation of pilot programs to test ways to 
verify the ETI code, in different settings and industries.  The pilots were focused on apparel 
production in China, tea plantations in Zimbabwe, and beverage production in South Africa.  An 
interim review of these projects was completed in November, 1999. 
 
The ETI approach, focusing as it has on small-scale experiments rather than ambitious 
plans to create monitoring and verification systems with worldwide applicability, has some 
notable advantages over the AIP.  First, because the initiative has been focused on promoting 
dialogue rather than prescriptions, it has avoided the tensions and political problems faced by 
AIP members.  Second, the pilot approach has integrated important real-world learning, based in 
some part on integration of views from the global South, into the discussion on monitoring and 
verification.  That said, the initiative has moved forward extremely slowly, and it remains to be 
seen whether it will ultimately contribute to the larger debate on worldwide labor regulation.  
Moreover, at least one of the pilot projects has had difficulty going forward; the sensitive issue 
of monitoring in China, a country with no independent NGOs or trade unions, has not yet been 
overcome. 
 
Fair Trade Charter 
 
In 1994, a model code of conduct called the Fair Trade Charter for Garments was 
developed by the Netherlands-based Clean Clothes Campaign, the Dutch trade union federation 
FNV, and the overseas development organization NOVIB.182  In 1996, Dutch garment 
manufacturers and retailers= associations agreed to participate in a working group to discuss the 
possible creation of a foundation to oversee implementation and monitoring of the Charter.  The 
working group has reached agreement on a number of issues, such as composition of the Board, 
governance functions of the foundation, and some principles regarding monitoring, but there 
remain a number of outstanding issues to be resolved before the initiative will be ready to 
undertake monitoring and verification activities. 
 
Canadian Partnership for Ethical Trading 
 
Labor and NGO allies in Canada came together in early 1999 to form the Canadian 
Partnership for Ethical Trading, a taskforce convened by the Canadian government at the behest 
of sweatshop activist groups.  Participating organizations include the Canadian Labor Congress, 
the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE), and the Maquila 
Solidarity Network, which houses a working group related to the initiative, the Ethical Trading 
Action Group.  The group proposed a base code of conduct in November, 1999 but that code 
continues to be the subject of negotiation with Canadian retailers. 
 
                                                 
182Atlin, Joan, Jeffcott, Bob, Ladd, Deena, and Lynda Yanz, APolicy Options to Improve Standards for 
Women Garment Workers in Canada and Internationally,@ report by Maquila Solidarity Network, October 15, 1998 
(draft), p. 65-66. 
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Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production (WRAP) 
 
Also in 1999, the American Apparel Manufacturers= Association (AAMA) launched its 
own code of conduct and monitoring initiative, known as the Worldwide Responsible Apparel 
Production (WRAP) Certification Program.  The WRAP program requires participants to 
undergo self-assessments of compliance with the WRAP principles, and calls for some 
independent verification of these self-assessments. 
 
The Canada-based Maquila Solidarity Network (MSN) has conducted a thorough and 
detailed critique of the WRAP program.183  The critique points out that the independence of the 
initiative cannot yet be addressed, as the program=s governing Board has not yet been named.  
Moreover, MSN points out two serious flaws in the program=s code of conduct and planned 
operation.  First, the code fails to protect workers= rights to organize and to bargain collectively. 
  
The assessment states,  
 
On the key issue of freedom of association, WRAP only requires that manufacturers 
respect that right where it is legally recognized (AApparel manufacturers will recognize 
and respect the right of employees to exercise their lawful rights of free association, 
including joining or not joining any association@). The last part of that clause n Aor not 
joining any association@ is consistent with Aright to work@ legislation, subverting 
collective bargaining. WRAP=s AProduction Facility Self-Assessment Handbook@ 
forbids Adiscrimination against employees who choose not to join any association.@ 
Collective bargaining n another ILO convention (#98) n is not recognized as a right by 
WRAP.  
 
The second serious flaw is that the program in no way provides for any level of public 
disclosure of factory monitoring reports, or any other information that would allow outside 
bodies or consumers to independently evaluate the effectiveness of the program.  In short, the 
program lacks transparency and provides no ways in which outside consumer or other pressure 
might be effectively used to improve the program or to generate change among employers in 
violation of the WRAP principles. 
 
Single-Company Initiatives 
 
                                                 
183ACritique of the Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production (WRAP) Program,@ Maquila Solidarity 
Network, April 2000 (available on the MSN=s website at www.web.net/~msn/5codes5.htm). 
a.  Independent Monitoring Group of El Salvador.  In 1995, the National Labor Committee, a 
US-based NGO that had been active in supporting human rights in Central America for a decade, 
documented abusive labor conditions in El Salvador, including the firing of several hundred 
workers who tried to organize a union in a factory called Mandarin.  Mandarin produced clothing 
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for Liz Claiborne, The Gap and other American companies.  Liz Claiborne chose to avoid 
negative publicity by ceasing all orders to the factory.  The Gap also tried to sever its ties to the 
company, but under the pressure of public criticism, instead developed a code of conduct and, by 
the spring of 1996, accepted the services of a monitoring group in El Salvador comprised of local 
human rights and labor research organizations, the Independent Monitoring Group of El 
Salvador (GMIES).  This group maintained communication with a committee based in New 
York in which several North American labor and human rights groups participated.  These 
committees negotiated with The Gap a process to respect workers rights and to reinstate the 
workers who had been fired.  
 
This dual structure established a model monitoring operation that included a number of 
innovations: NGO monitors were allowed free access to the factory on a regular and frequent 
basis; monitors were given financial data to determine when production had reached a level 
sufficient to enlarge the work force by rehiring retrenched unionists, and a regular reporting 
system was established between the monitors on the ground and the advisory committee in New 
York.  By 1997, this scheme had resulted in the rehiring of six fired trade union leaders and 
several dozen workers who had been laid off during the labor conflict, and a marked 
improvement in working conditions within the Mandarin plant.184 
 
While a recent survey revealed that the overwhelming majority of workers in the plant 
felt that conditions had improved since the introduction of the monitoring group, the project has 
had its problems.  The issue of who will fund the project has not been resolved.  In the first year, 
the monitoring group received matching funds from the National Labor Committee and The Gap. 
 In the second year, The Gap discontinued funding and it is not clear who will fund the group in 
future.185  Another issue concerns the relationship between the monitoring group and the trade 
union it was established to assist.  Since that time the company has established its own union 
within the plant, which has all but destroyed support for the original union.  The monitoring 
group has been unable to intervene in this problem.  The limitations of the monitoring project vis 
a vis the Mandarin's two trade unions will be taken up below in the Issues section of this paper. 
 
It should also be noted that despite the success of this program, the Gap has not initiated 
independent monitoring of any other supplier factories anywhere in the world, despite pressure 
from investors and campaign groups186, and its promises to do so. 
 
b.  Commission to Verify Codes of Conduct (COVERCO) 
                                                 
184Anner, Mark, ALa Maquila y El Monitoreo Independiente en El Salvador,@ paper presented at the 
Encounter on Independent Monitoring, San Salvador, January 13 1998 (on file at ILRF). 
185A new ILRF initiative, funded by a consortium of US universities, may allow ILRF to assist GMIES to 
develop and expand its monitoring work. 
186Principally, the ethical investment organization, Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, and the 
NGO Global Exchange. 
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In October, 1999 a Guatemala-based consortium of human rights and labor activists, the 
Commission to Verify Codes of Conduct (COVERCO), completed an independent assessment of 
labor issues at a garment factory producing apparel for Liz Claiborne, Inc.  The problems 
identified included forced overtime, hazardous safety and health conditions, and improper 
record-keeping.  The investigation was conducted with the full knowledge and support of Liz 
Claiborne, Inc. 
 
The COVERCO investigation marked the first time that a US-based retailer contracted 
directly with human rights groups in a producer country both to investigate and report publicly 
on problems in its supplier factories, and to provide ongoing monitoring of those factories to 
ensure that problems are corrected.  The report, issued on October 15, represented the conclusion 
of the initial investigation. The retailer agreed to take remedial action in problem areas identified 
by the initial investigation, and COVERCO will continue ongoing monitoring work of the 
facility to ensure that recommendations are implemented. 
 
Other single-company initiatives include a 1999 audit of Mattel Corporation=s toy 
facilities in China and Southeast Asia by an independent monitoring body convened expressly 
for this purpose (the Mattel Independent Monitoring Council, or MIMCO), and a report by an 
Indonesian team of researchers, commissioned by Reebok corporation, of two Reebok sport shoe 
factories in Indonesia (the Peduli HAK report). 
 
 
Monitors for Hire 
 
During the past two years a number of companies have developed labor auditing services, 
provided to companies on a for-profit basis.  These companies include accounting firms Ernst 
and Young and Price Waterhouse Coopers.  The problems with for-profit auditing initiatives are 
discussed in the next section.  An independent non-profit organization, Verite, has also been 
established to provide labor auditing services to companies on a paid, contractual basis. 
 
 
Issues to be Resolved 
 
Initiatives to promote codes of conduct and independent monitoring and verification 
systems have made great strides in recent years.  While these initiatives have garnered far more 
widespread attention and support from employers, consumers and trade unions than any previous 
such efforts, and have achieved notable success in pushing the discussion on corporate 
responsibility forward, nevertheless there remain several outstanding issues under debate.  
Below we review the most significant of these questions and outline our position on each. 
 
1.  Do Codes Undermine Collective Bargaining? 
 
Although unions and union federations have been prominent participants in the 
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promotion of, and creation of bodies to monitor, codes of conduct187, nevertheless many activists 
in the trade union movement both in the United States and elsewhere have expressed fears that 
codes of conduct, if implemented, may obviate the need for trade unions to negotiate collective 
bargaining agreements on behalf of an enterprise's workforce.  They fear that monitors will most 
likely be appointed from the NGO community, and, in handling grievances, take over the 
function of democratically-elected union leadership, thus removing the democratic right of 
workers to have a direct say in their own wages and working conditions. 
 
                                                 
187i.e., the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE) and Retail, Sales and 
Department Store Workers= Union (RSDWU) participated in the creation of the AIP code of conduct; the British 
Trades Union Council is a member of the ETI; the Dutch union federation FNV is part of the  Fair Trade 
Foundation; the International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers= Federation (ITGLWF) Secretary-General Neil 
Kearney is a board member of the Council on Economic Priorities' new SA 8000 program. 
The experience of the Independent Monitoring Group of El Salvador highlights the 
relevance of such fears.  GMIES emerged as a response to a particular situation, that of the mass 
dismissal of independent trade union activists at the Mandarin plant.  It succeeded in its original 
goal to compel the company to re-hire the fired activists.  However, subsequently the group was 
saddled with the larger responsibility of monitoring overall company compliance with The Gap's 
code of conduct, a task for which it was unprepared, and which it undertook in a vacuum of 
coordinated guidance or oversight. 
 
GMIES' role shifted away from one of supporting the independent union, and toward one 
of investigating and handling complaints of company non-compliance with labor standards in its 
code.  By early 1998, the group had adopted a "neutral" stance vis a vis the conflict between the 
original, independent union and the company union.  Superior resources and friendly 
relationships with management had allowed the company union to win widespread support 
among workers, whereas the independent union had dwindled to a small handful of supporters.  
 
While the GMIES experiment did not lead to the establishment of a vibrant, independent 
trade union in the factory, it did serve to neutralize some of the factors that had previously made 
union organizing impossible, and to assist fired trade unionists to regain employment.  This may 
reflect more broadly an important role for NGO monitors: they may serve as a check on 
employer behavior to prevent workers from exercising their right to associate.  While this role is 
a limited one, given the severe restrictions on workers= right to associate today, particularly in 
the garment and other light manufacturing industries, monitoring may play a very useful role in 
strengthening nascent trade union activity. 
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We note that in most developing countries, employers are free to employ a wide variety 
of union-busting techniques at the slightest sign of independent organizing activity.  The 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) has estimated that between 300 to 
500 workers are killed each year for their organizing activities.  Thousands more are arrested, 
beaten or intimidated.  There are between 65,000 and 75,000 cases of union leaders reported to 
be fired for their activities each year.  Many thousands more cases go unreported.188  Those who 
suggest that independent monitors will prevent independent unions from forming are to some 
extent ignoring the far more significant impediments that exist to independent union formation, 
such as employers' ability to enlist the support of police or other local authorities to arrest or 
intimidate workers, and the near-impossibility of resolving unfair terminations in a timely 
manner through local judicial systems. 
 
One of the most important roles a monitoring group can play, particularly in closed 
polities such as China, where information flow on labor issues is carefully restricted, will be to 
collect information about such terminations and to pressure employers to act immediately to 
rehire these workers.  This is an area in which immediate pressure from Western consumers and 
advocacy groups is far more likely to be effective than recourse to local judicial processes.  The 
practice is also likely to act as a deterrent to any future such firings, thus removing a significant 
obstacle to union organizing. 
 
                                                 
188ICFTU Annual Report 1997. 
Where independent unions exist, monitors within the workplace should be delegates of 
the union itself.  In many if not most light manufacturing enterprises in developing countries, 
however, independent unions have not been able to form.  In such a context, monitors may also 
serve a useful role in simply providing information to workers about their rights under a 
company's code.  In this way, non-union monitors can and should become allies to union 
activists, not replacements for them. 
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Codes may help promote development of trade unions, provided they contain protections 
for workers' rights to associate and form unions, and to bargain collectively.  By and large, the 
protections listed in codes of conduct do not vary significantly from protections contained in 
most countries' labor laws.  Abuses occur because governments fail to enforce these laws.  One 
area in which the problem is not enforcement, but weak legislation itself, is that of trade union 
activity.  Many developing countries have consciously adopted a strategy of suppressing or 
heavily regulating all trade union activity.189  The links between such strategies and 
governments= desires to attract foreign investment, particularly in the manufacturing sector, are 
exemplified by the additional restrictions placed on labor organizing in export processing 
zones.190 In short, the Arace to the bottom@ has been as much a race to weaken trade union and 
bargaining rights as it has been a race to provide cheap wages.  Codes of conduct have the 
potential to play a critical role in the promotion of free trade unions in such places, provided they 
contain language protecting workers= rights to associate and form unions and to bargain 
collectively.  By pressuring MNCs not only to adopt but to honor such language, worker 
advocates may be able to create a context within which free trade unions can develop even under 
restrictive legal frameworks.   
 
2.  Who Should Monitor Companies' Compliance with their Codes? 
 
Companies have experimented with three types of monitoring of codes: internal, external 
and independent.  These definitions are taken from the report, AThe Apparel Industry and Codes 
of Conduct: A Solution to the International Child Labor Problem?@ produced by the US 
Department of Labor=s Bureau of International Affairs in 1996.  The definitions themselves are 
the subject of debate.  Some feel that external monitoring is, in fact, independent monitoring 
while others feel it more closely resembles internal monitoring.  This paper retains the DOL 
definitions in order to distinguish between monitoring performed on contract to the company and 
that which is not.  For the purposes of the discussion below, internal monitoring is that 
conducted by representatives of the company (either the MNC or the supplier) itself.  External 
monitoring is conducted by a third party, a Amonitor-for-hire,@ under contract to the company 
on a for-profit basis.  Independent monitoring (also referred to as independent verification) is 
that which is performed by a group which does not have a direct or exclusive relationship with 
the company; usually some level of public reporting is a part of independent monitoring. 
                                                 
189For a case study of government strategies of labor repression in Asia, see Deyo, Frederick, Beneath the 
Miracle: Labor Suppression in East Asia. 
190For example, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Malaysia all allow trade unions to function elsewhere but not in 
EPZs; see ILRF petition on Pakistan=s GSP privileges.  Sri Lanka placed severe restrictions on labor in EPZs until a 
GSP petition brought about improvement. 
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Internal Monitoring 
 
Internal monitoring is that conducted by employees or representatives of the retailer itself 
or of its supplier.  Its advantages are that monitors may be allowed free access to all information 
relevant to the production process without risk of jeopardizing any privileged information, such 
as trade secrets.  The basic problem with internal monitoring is that it relies on the Agood faith@ 
of the company itself.  The premise of consumer pressure is removed because even those 
companies with the best of intentions will have no incentive to reveal their own bad practices to 
the public.  Where the company has a genuine desire to be a good corporate citizen, or to 
improve its labor practices for reasons of improved efficiency, stability, or to avoid negative 
publicity, individuals entrusted with monitoring may be able to enforce real compliance with 
standards.  Where, however, the monitoring is being done merely to placate a hostile consumer 
audience, efforts to monitor may be restricted to a mere exercise in public relations.  Under such 
circumstances, information presented by the company to the public cannot be relied upon.   
 
An example of such an exercise in Abad faith@ was the advertising campaign launched by 
Guess? Inc. in December, 1997.  In previous years, Guess? had been the target of consumer 
campaigns to publicize the company=s labor abuses.  In December, the company took out full-
page ads in the New York Times and other regional newspapers advertising its jeans as Asweat 
free@ and stating that the company had been given a clean bill of health by the US Department of 
Labor.  In fact the Department of Labor had cited Guess? suppliers in the United States for labor 
violations earlier in the year, and insisted that the company remove the claim from its 
advertisements.  The Guess? strategy illustrates the problems consumers might face if their only 
source of information were companies themselves. 
 
External Monitoring 
 
External monitoring is monitoring contracted out by the company itself to a third party.  
Nike International provides an example of a company using external monitoring.  For the past 
few years the corporation has hired the accounting firm Ernst and Young to provide labor audits 
of its plants in Southeast Asia.  In 1997, Nike also contracted Goodworks International, a non-
profit led by former US Ambassador Andrew Young, to inspect its plants in China and Southeast 
Asia.   
 
External monitoring carries an information flow problem similar to that of internal 
monitoring.  Since the external monitor is on contract to the company, the monitor is not free to 
disseminate information publicly.  Instead, a confidential report is issued to the company which 
the company itself may or may not disseminate.  This was a problem which arose in the Nike/ 
Ernst and Young example.  The company discovered serious health and safety hazards at Nike 
producing facilities in Vietnam, but was precluded from publicizing this information.  Despite its 
findings, Ernst and Young nonetheless certified that Nike was in compliance with its code.  Nike 
chose not to correct the violations, and continued to assert publicly that the audits were assisting 
suppliers to improve their labor conditions.  An independent NGO representative discovered and 
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publicized the violations uncovered by Ernst and Young, to the company=s embarrassment.191 
 
Another criticism leveled against external for-profit monitors is that they may not have 
the expertise or sensitivity necessary to conduct accurate interviews with workers.  This criticism 
operates on two levels.  First is the suggestion that an accounting firm or otherwise 
inexperienced group may simply not know what questions to ask.  This problem can be 
overcome by a system to train and accredit monitors, a subject to be discussed in the following 
section.  Second is the suggestion that workers may be afraid to provide external monitors, 
whom they perceive as company representatives, with accurate information.  This was the 
criticism leveled against Andrew Young, who conducted his tour of Nike factories accompanied 
by factory management and made no attempts to interview workers in a confidential setting. 
              
Independent Monitoring/Verification 
 
Independent monitoring is that conducted by a third party not on exclusive contract to the 
company itself.  Independent monitoring may use Amonitors-for-hire@ or may use local 
organizations, including labor, religious, human rights or other community-based groups, to 
conduct labor investigations in zones where such groups are located.  This approach is 
exemplified by the Independent Monitoring Group of El Salvador, described earlier in this 
section.  In theory monitoring by a firm such as Ernst and Young may be considered independent 
if the monitor is not acting as an agent of the company it is monitoring, or is not subject to a 
conflict of interest caused by the fact it may have or seek other commercial relationships with the 
company.  For example in the Nike/Ernst and Young case, Ernst and Young could not be 
considered independent, even if their labor audits were paid for by a source other than Nike, 
because they have a separate commercial relationship with Nike to conduct the company=s 
financial audits and a consequent disincentive to be overly, or even appropriately, critical of 
labor pactices, since the other financial interest outweighed the social auditing program 
incentive. 
 
Monitoring cannot work without a reliable, confidential reporting procedure.  Workers 
in most developing countries know that they are vulnerable to being fired without cause, and that 
legal redress, if it is available at all, may take years in process.  Rather than lose their jobs, most 
individual workers will exercise caution in criticizing their employer or airing their grievances 
publicly, or even confidentially.  The most trustworthy interviewers will inevitably be those who 
arise from the ranks of the workers themselves, or from their communities.  Local organizations 
are also best equipped to deal with language and other locale-specific barriers, since they possess 
the cultural knowledge necessary both to frame questions appropriately and to interpret answers 
                                                 
191ASmoke from a Hired Gun,@ report by Dara O=Rourke, Transnational Research and Action Center 
(TRAC), November, 1997.  This report is on file at ILRF and also available at TRAC=s Corporate Watch website 
(www.corpwatch.org). 
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accurately.  
 
Independent trade unions, led by representatives elected directly by an enterprise=s 
workers, are the organizations best equipped to set up a monitoring and reporting process 
within a factory.  Independent trade unions may already have in place the grievance-handling 
procedures necessary to obtain reliable ongoing information from workers.  As self-funding 
organizations, trade unions are also the most cost-effective monitors.  Unfortunately, in many of 
the countries to which production of consumer goods has fled, authoritarian regimes prohibit or 
control labor organizing and unions, if they exist at all, are neither independent nor 
representative of workers= interests.  Indonesia under Suharto provides a prominent example of 
such practices.  Even where laws protecting unions are adequate, lax enforcement often means 
that in practice workers= bargaining power is weak.  In such countries, community based 
organizations often take an active role in promoting workers= welfare.  Staff of such 
organizations may spend a considerable amount of time getting to know workers and their 
families, and may have sufficient trust and status within the area to be able to probe for sensitive 
information. 
 
In cases where trade unions do not exist or are not free to play a key role in this process, 
NGOs provide a viable alternative.  There are some drawbacks to the NGO approach; most 
notably, because it is localized, start-up of a monitoring effort is extremely time- and labor-
intensive.  Another problem with the NGO approach is that, again because it is localized, it may 
suffer from consistency between regions or countries.  It may be that Alevels@ of monitoring are 
needed, where one level, that of direct worker interviews, is conducted by local groups and other 
levels (such as measuring levels of hazardous substances, or verifying adequate ventilation and 
fire precautions) is conducted in a more generalized or standardized fashion. 
 
3.  How Should Monitoring be Regulated? 
 
Whether independent monitoring is conducted by international or by local groups, there 
is a need to regulate the monitors themselves in order to ensure that information to be provided 
to consumers is consistent and accurate.  Initially, monitors should be accredited by a body that 
is recognizable and trusted by consumers.  After accreditation, groups should be provided with 
guidance as to the types of information they are expected to provide.  If the strategy of using 
local organizations is adopted, companies and worker advocates in consuming countries may 
wish to develop a training program to teach such organizations how to gather the relevant 
information and how to present it in a standard format that can be used easily by companies and 
consumer advocates.  An essential function of an accreditation body would be to revoke 
accreditation from monitors who are found to be unreliable or otherwise substandard. 
 
A regulatory body serves the additional role of middleman between the company and the 
monitor.  As noted above, independent monitoring precludes that contracted directly by the 
company, except under carefully regulated circumstances.  In order to preserve the independence 
of monitoring groups, whether they be business firms or NGOs, an independent regulatory body 
must evaluate information, ensure that it meets standards of the accreditation program, and 
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ensure transparency of the process in such a way as to preclude any inappropriate relationships 
between the monitors and companies.  The Rugmark program has such a body.  The Fair Labor 
Association and Fair Trade Foundation represent other examples of regulatory intermediaries 
between companies and monitors.  
 
The ILO may be able to play a useful role in the area of standardization of monitoring 
and reporting, by sharing through training or informational programs its own measures or 
benchmarks for compliance with ILO conventions.  Such an exchange might also facilitate 
convergence of different private initiative toward a globally applicable labor rights monitoring 
framework. 
 
4.  Who Should Pay for Monitoring? 
 
The possible sources of funding are, in essence, corporations, governments and 
worker/consumer advocates (trade unions and other civic organizations).  Various mixes of 
funding from these entities may provide for monitoring to take place and to remain independent. 
 The critical issue here is not who provides the funding, but what steps are taken to ensure that 
monitors may retain their independence from any single party and are not biased by the source of 
funding.  Direct financial relationships between the monitor and company are not precluded, as 
long as the public interest is protected by measures that include transparency of monitoring 
contracts, some form of public access to results of audits, and protections against side payments 
or other improper transactions between the contracting parties.   
 
The Rugmark example provides one workable funding scenario: companies wishing to 
utilize the services of monitors pay a licensing fee to an independent overseer (in this case, the 
Rugmark Foundation) and that overseer in turn provides inspection services.  Since inspectors 
are not paid directly by their clients they are able to maintain their objectivity.  The Rugmark 
program also institutes other safeguards to ensure that inspectors are not vulnerable to bribery or 
other possible compromises of their integrity. 
 
The Independent Monitoring Group of El Salvador in its first year used another model of 
funding, one in which the company itself and a worker advocate, the National Labor Committee, 
contributed equally to its upkeep.  The group=s independence from each funder was thus 
assured.  However, The Gap=s failure to provide a second year of funding is indicative of 
problems with this approach that might best be addressed if funding were to be channeled 
through a neutral body with ongoing oversight responsibility.  
 
5.  Do Codes Undermine Efforts to Strengthen National and International Labor Standards? 
 
Some have expressed concern that by functioning independently of any country's legal 
system, codes of conduct and independent monitoring may palliate local desire to improve legal 
standards.  In fact we feel codes and independent monitoring provide an important, 
complementary mechanism to augment enforcement of existing legal systems, and may foster 
greater desire to improve those systems.  By adopting a code, a corporation also acknowledges 
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its responsibility to abide by local labor laws.  In most cases, local labor laws even in developing 
countries offer adequate protections for workers, conforming with at least minimum international 
standards on subjects such as working hours, overtime compensation, forced labor and child 
labor.192  However, abuses occur because governments lack adequate enforcement budgets, or 
are offered multiple incentives to protect the interests of elites and capital rather than enforcing 
these laws.  For example, in both China and Indonesia, partnerships between top military 
officials and investors have been documented.193  Such alliances give the military in both 
countries every incentive to safeguard their investments by participating in labor repression.   
 
If monitored, codes may improve enforcement of local labor laws.  The codes approach 
recognizes that in many developing countries, workers may be unaware of existing legal 
protections.  Even where they have information about such laws, workers may hesitate to involve 
corrupt or unsympathetic labor officials in their grievances.  Through monitors, workers may 
gain access to information not only about a company=s code of conduct but also about local 
labor laws and legal protections.  Furthermore, if effective monitoring mechanisms can be 
established, it may be easier and less intimidating for a worker to use such mechanisms than to 
bring problems to the attention of local officials or courts.  The development of such alternate 
dispute resolution mechanisms for MNCs with codes of conduct may provide officials in 
developing countries with incentives to better enforce existing labor laws, in order to preserve 
their own jurisdiction.  At very least such an approach provides some workers with another 
option to seek redress for grievances.  This approach may ultimately have a spillover effect from 
MNCs that adopt and comply with codes to local employers, as workers share information 
between enterprises.  Workers in local enterprises are ultimately unlikely to tolerate dual systems 
of enforcement. 
 
The codes approach may also create incentives for some MNCs to become allies in the 
movement for harmonized labor standards and consistent enforcement of those standards.  By 
initially creating an environment of greater accountability for MNCs with codes, it puts them at a 
competitive disadvantage to MNCs in the same industry without codes producing in the same 
countries.  The approach may therefore convince Agood@ companies that in order to compete 
effectively, they too have an interest in advocating for uniform adoption and implementation of 
labor legislation. 
 
6.  Should Codes Define a Living Wage? 
 
The basic content of most codes of conduct does not vary significantly from the 
internationally-recognized worker rights called for in debates for a social clause in international 
                                                 
192An exception to this generalization are local laws regulating trade union activity, discussed below. 
193See Simbolon, Johannes,AABRI, from War Machine to Big Business Bureaucrats,@ in Jakarta Post, 
October 1, 1995; also AChina=s People=s Liberation Army: Where to Find PLA Companies in America, What 
Products the PLA Sells in America and Who are the PLA=s Customers,@ report issued by Food and Allied Service 
Trades Department, AFL-CIO. 
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trade agreements.  Insofar as this is true, the standards represent a broad international consensus 
on fundamental worker rights which has been generated by advocates in both developed and 
developing countries.  The list of generally agreed-upon standards includes elimination of forced 
labor, elimination of child labor, decent wages and working conditions, decent health and safety 
standards, non-discrimination, the right to organize and bargain collectively.  Most industry and 
company codes incorporate all of these standards.  One issue that remains unresolved is the 
debate on wages.  The AIP and ETI codes call for employers to pay either minimum or 
prevailing wages in the countries where they produce, and to recognize the need for those wages 
to meet workers= basic needs.  Critics of this provision note that in most developing countries, 
the minimum or prevailing wages are insufficient to provide a basic market basket of goods to 
most workers.  These critics call for the establishment of criteria to define what a living wage 
would be in each country, and call on companies to agree to pay this amount rather than 
minimum wage. 
 
The debate on living wages has been a contentious one, in no small part because, unlike 
other rights covered by corporate codes, the definition of a living wage has yet to be clearly 
established by any international convention.194  Nor do economists or other social scientists 
agree on a cross-country definition of a standard market basket of goods.  Since international 
consensus on this issue is lacking, consumer country advocates for a living wage clause have 
been particularly susceptible to the argument that they are acting out of protectionist rather than 
humanitarian motivations. 
 
It is our position that the living wage issue cannot be resolved without (a) substantial 
further research and the development of a reasonable and widely acceptable cross-cultural index 
to measure basic needs; and (b) substantial effort by developed country advocates of a living 
wage to engage in open dialogue on this issue with trade unions and NGOs in developing 
countries.  We note that to date, such dialogue has consisted principally of Northern NGOs 
asking Southern partners to make assessments of economic indicators in their particular 
countries, rather than engaging in participation as full partners in the issue of standard-setting.  
As noted in this paper=s earlier discussion on the development and promotion of a social clause, 
the wage issue is an extremely important one, but it is unlikely that it can be promoted by US or 
other consumer-country advocates in a manner that adequately addresses developing-country 
fears of protectionism.   
 
International dialogue, perhaps oriented toward a re-examination of ILO language on 
wage-fixing machinery, is a vital first step to further discussion and definition of the living wage. 
                                                 
194The UN=s Universal Declaration of Human Rights notes the right of workers to earn a living wage.  The 
ILO=s Tripartite Declaration also affirms the responsibility of MNCs to provide a wage Aat least adequate to satisfy 
the basic needs of workers and their families. @ However neither of these international fora have been able to resolve 
the question of how minimum wages or basic needs should be measured or set.  See Rothstein, Richard, 
ADeveloping Reasonable Standards for Judging Whether Minimum Wage Levels in Developing Countries are 
Acceptable,@ Bureau of International Labor Affairs, US Department of Labor, June 1996; see also Athreya, Bama 
and Natacha Thys, AEmpowering Workers Toward a Living Wage: A Position Paper,@ International Labor Rights 
Fund, Fall 1999. 
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 Without such dialogue, advocates in the North run the risk of undermining gains made by NGOs 
and trade unions in the South.  In the meanwhile, it is our position that codes of conduct should 
not set wages, but rather should provide an absolute floor for wages.  Promotion and vigilant 
monitoring of workers= right to bargain collectively is the ultimate way to ensure that workers 
receive wages adequate to meet their basic needs.   
 
This view, however, does not lessen the moral and pragmatic imperatives to provide 
workers with wages adequate to allow them to live decently.195  Trade unions and other worker 
advocates should bring the living wage discussion into the broader context of the debate for a 
social clause, and should, through continued consumer pressure, support and bolster efforts by 
trade unions and NGOs in the South to negotiate appropriate wages. 
 
Conclusion 
 
                                                 
195See Athreya and Thys, AEmpowering Workers Toward a Living Wage: A Position Paper.@ 
The codes of conduct approach offers a valuable means to create and foster dialogues 
between developed world and developing world advocates for labor and consumer rights. The 
strategy is, in effect, an extension of an older, proven strategy to mobilize consumer support for 
workers:  the boycott.  Threats of boycott action have helped turn the tide in labor/management 
battles in the United States and other developed countries on numerous occasions.  Codes of 
conduct help to extend consumer awareness of labor's problems and battles in less-developed 
parts of the world.  Exposes of labor rights abuses, whether child labor in the soccer ball industry 
or trade union harassment in El Salvador, were made possible by the creation of alliances 
between developed world and developing world advocates.   
 
Consumers in the US and other developed countries have become increasingly aware that 
many of the goods they consume are produced under inhumane or substandard conditions in 
locales such as Pakistan and Guatemala.  As this awareness increases, so to does the awareness 
of citizens of developed countries that they live in a global economy, and that trade relations 
between countries do affect their day to day lives.  This awareness has in recent months led to 
the mobilization of the North American and European consumer publics around issues such as 
the meetings of the WTO in Seattle in 1999, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
meetings in Washington, DC in April, 2000, and even the relatively obscure Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment.  In short, raised awareness about conditions in garment and toy 
factories has helped introduce and foster broader debates on trade and human rights issues. 
 
 The area of activism is, moreover, one that has given rise to significant, far-ranging and 
quickly progressing new efforts at global regulation over the past few years.  In addition to the 
initiatives detailed in this paper, UN Secretary General Kofi Annam has led the United Nations 
into new initiatives in the area of voluntary codes of conduct and corporate accountability.  
Despite the fears of some advocates that such efforts will undermine more stringent attempts to 
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promote global governance, a natural convergence of the strategies has occurred in at least two 
areas:  that of internationally binding legislation, and that of cross-border contract negotiations. 
 
 As early as 1991, the US Congress attempted to legislate a code of conduct for US 
corporations doing business in China.  The code would have required an annual review of the 
practices of all corporations in China, and would have provided for some sanction to those 
companies that failed to implement the code.  The initiative has been revived a number of times 
over the past decade, and at different moments was passed by both the House of Representatives 
and the US Senate.  A new version has recently been circulated, and in the wake of debates over 
China’s entry into the WTO, may well find support in both legislative houses, creating a 
precedent for binding corporations to a code of conduct, allowing for public review of corporate 
behavior, and sanctioning non-compliant corporations.  A parallel initiative was taken by the 
European Parliament last year, which passed a resolution calling for EU-based corporations to 
abide by a set of human rights principles in their operations worldwide.  However, while the 
European Parliament may be empowered to review corporate behavior, it is unable to impose 
sanctions on violators. 
 
 Another notable initiative is that undertaken by the International Federation of Building 
and Wood Workers (IFBWW), which in recent years has negotiated an internationally-applicable 
code of conduct with furniture manufacturer Ikea Corporation.  Ikea has agreed to accept the 
code as binding on its relationships with all IFBWW member unions, in all countries of 
operation, setting an important precedent for contract negotiations at the worldwide level.
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IV. Conclusion -- Strategies for Cooperation to Improve Labor 
Rights Enforcement.  
 
 
The discussion of using trade as a mechanism for regulating social issues confirms both 
that there is a growing consensus on what to do and a significant increase in cross-border 
solidarity and cooperation. The success of U.S. activists in denying in the U.S. Congress 
President Clinton’s request for “fast track” authority to expand NAFTA, and the diversity of 
opposition to the WTO as evidenced by events both inside and outside the 1999 Ministerial 
meetings in Seattle, demonstrate that now is the time to build on the momentum of opposition to 
“free trade” and work to develop an alternative model of economic integration that respects 
people and the environment. This success should not be overstated, however. There was a 
significant block of votes in opposition to fast track that would not support any effort to include 
a social clause in future trade agreements. We should likewise be  encouraged that trade unions 
of the Mercosur countries have agreed among themselves to the terms of a social charter and 
they have managed to get a seat at the table in discussing the process of economic integration. 
They have not yet, however, managed to overcome the united effort of employers and 
governments to block inclusion of the social charter in the Mercosur agreement.  
 
 
In no single country does the labor movement, with supporting NGOs, have the political 
clout to have its agenda enacted into law. Considering the resounding defeat of the first effort to 
gain inclusion of the labor clause at the WTO, ultimate success may be a very long term goal.  
There is much to do, but generally we know what needs to be done. First and foremost, we must 
cooperate globally with trade unions, human rights and environmental NGOs, church groups, 
academics, and progressive members of the business and government communities to agree on a 
final version of a social clause and get to work on a political strategy to press for its adoption in 
all trade agreements. We must develop allies in key countries to pressure their governments to 
support the labor clause in all future trade agreements and support its inclusion in the WTO. We 
must act as educators at every event we can attend to inform people about the need for a social 
clause, how it would work, and why it is essential to an overall strategy of achieving sustainable 
economic development. We must work in our own countries to defeat efforts to expand the 
existing corporatist trade agenda and work to convert our governments to become advocates for 
the labor clause at multilateral gatherings. 
 
There is also much to do on a company-specific basis. We must share information about 
MNCs and cooperate in targeted consumer boycotts. Perhaps we can agree with allies to select 
each year a company to be named the worst labor violator in the world, and have that company 
be the focus of global boycott activities for a year. We have seen the power of cross-border 
cooperation in several NAALC cases. In one case involving independent union organizing in the 
Han Young factory,  a Hyundai affiliate in Tijuana, the NAALC complaint provided a forum for 
international action including demonstrations at Hyundai dealerships in the United States. 
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Pressure from the AFL-CIO and its affiliates caused President Clinton to raise the issue with 
President Zedillo, and the Mexican government took immediate action to enforce the law and 
protect the rights of the individuals who had sought to form an independent union. One way to 
get support from the business community for a labor clause is to create enough grassroots-driven 
boycott activity that resistant companies will want to have stable rules to govern the situation. 
 
Immediate first steps should center around building upon the momentum of the 1999 
Seattle events; a promising follow-up was made at meetings of the World Bank and IMF in 
Washington, DC in early 2000 although more work is needed to ensure that messages from 
developed and developing-world advocates can be reconciled.  The grassroots agreement to 
oppose present policies on trade and investment must blossom into an alternative vision, and 
specific alternative proposals.  
 
Ultimately, advocates for worker rights must trust each other. We need to move beyond 
nationalistic suspicions and judge by actions that have achieved positive results. MNCs and 
governments are allied on a global level. The WTO is the best example of their power of unity. 
Workers have the advantage of numbers, voting power, and a belief in their cause. In unity, we 
can overcome the obstacles and earn justice for workers in the global economy.     
 
 
 
 
